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Globally, critical infrastructure (CI), such as energy, water, transport, information and 
communication technology, health, food supply, banking and finance, government services, safety and 
emergency services are required to ensure the provision of public services, economic growth and social 
development. Since the late 1990s, countries have been designing and implementing public policies and 
strategies to protect CI from various threats. Initially, policies were focused on the physical protection of 
CI to physical hazards such as terrorism due to events such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United 
States and 2004 Madrid and 2005 London terrorist attacks but have quickly evolved to reflect the 
evolving and unpredictable global landscape of threats such as natural disasters, ageing infrastructure, 
cyber-attacks and many more.  
Scholars have noted that the adoption of “critical infrastructure resilience” is necessary to ensure 
the safety and well-being of global communities in light of the evolving landscape of threats, including 
political threats and the intricate interconnectedness of global infrastructure. Research of CI resilience 
shows promising signs of interest among scholars. However, some of the most fundamental questions 
around the concept are still not widely understood, such as: How is critical infrastructure resilience 
defined? How is it assessed?; How can governments, policy leaders, practitioners and CI owners and 
operators enhance CI resilience? For these reasons, this study seeks to fill the research gap and establish 
the current knowledge on critical infrastructure resilience among the literature and address several 
fundamental questions to ensure a consistent understanding of the concept. This study aims to contribute 
to knowledge about critical infrastructure resilience by systematically reviewing relevant scholarly 
literature, analyzing its major and minor themes, and identifying future research directions.  
The results draw several conclusions including the limited research of CI resilience outside of 
engineering, a lack of consensus surrounding the definition of CI resilience and a narrow perspective of 
the risks to CI. Finally, future research recommendations include an increased research focus on societal 
resilience and additional examination of non-physical risks. Furthermore, an analysis of CI resilience 
among a more diversified set of industries including healthcare, emergency services, food production and 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Problem Statement 
Communities rely on critical infrastructure (CI) to ensure the provision of critical public services, 
economic growth and social development. Globally, the dominant sectors are energy, water, transport, 
information and communication technology, health, food supply, banking and finance, government 
services, safety and emergency services. Major and minor events can have significant impacts on critical 
infrastructure, which can cause extreme harm to the well-being of society. Some recent examples include 
the 2021 ice storm in Texas, which overwhelmed the state’s electricity infrastructure, caused power 
outages to nearly 4.5 million homes for several days and resulted in 57 deaths. Furthermore, the 
electricity outage cascaded into failures for every power source, including natural gas, coal, wind and 
nuclear (Sparber, 2021). More recently, Hurricane Elsa in the United States resulted in heavy rains and 
flash flooding in major subway stations and roads in New York City in July 2021 (Adelson & et al., 
2021). Cyber-attacks such as the one that occurred in February 2021, where a hacker attempted to raise 
the sodium hydroxide levels in a Florida cities’ water supply to poison residents, are a growing threat to 
society as CI becomes increasingly dependent on interconnected networks (Greenberg, 2021).  
Since the late 1990s, countries have been designing and implementing public policies and strategies 
to protect CI from various threats. Initially, policies were focused on the physical protection of CI to 
physical hazards such as terrorism due to events such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States and 
2004 Madrid and 2005 London terrorist attacks but have quickly evolved to reflect the evolving and 
unpredictable global landscape of threats such as natural disasters, ageing infrastructure, cyber-attacks 
and many more. Notably, CI policies and strategies have now considered climate change a significant 
threat to social and economic well-being. The increasing frequency and intensity of extreme weather and 
natural disasters have shown the potential to impact CI's functioning severely. Furthermore, global 
widespread market liberalization and privatization policies, particularly in North America and Europe, 
have led to the transfer of ownership and operation of CI from the government to the private sector. 
Alongside this transition, there has also been a trend of deregulation of several industries and fiscal 
austerity, leaving many CI sectors self-regulated and underfunded (Curt & Tacnet, 2018; Murray & 
Grubesic, 2012; Pursiainen, 2018). Furthermore, globalization has resulted in an unprecedented level of 





disruption to their neighbouring countries’ infrastructure (OECD, 2019; Pursiainen, 2018). For example, a 
power outage in 2003 in Ohio resulted in several power failures in southeastern Canada and affected other 
sectors such as financial, transportation, and manufacturing (OECD, 2019). 
 Scholars have noted that the adoption of “critical infrastructure resilience” is necessary to ensure the 
safety and well-being of global communities in light of the evolving landscape of threats, including 
political threats and the intricate interconnectedness of global infrastructure. Several governments have 
addressed the need to adopt critical infrastructure resilience policies and strategies, but the state of 
academic knowledge around the concept has not been well-established. The idea has emerged in scholarly 
literature relatively recently. It shows promising signs of interest by researchers, but some of the most 
fundamental questions around the idea are still not widely understood, such as: How is critical 
infrastructure resilience defined? How is it assessed?; How can governments, policy leaders, practitioners 
and CI owners and operators enhance CI resilience?  
For these reasons, this study seeks to fill the research gap regarding the current state of knowledge of 
critical infrastructure resilience among the literature and address several fundamental questions to ensure 
a consistent understanding of the concept. This research will be conducted through the use of a systematic 
review which is a methodology that seeks to locate and synthesize the best available evidence related to 
specific research questions. Systematic reviews also seek to advance a research field to better inform 
decision-making for policy and strategy design. Fewer than than one percent of systematic reviews exist 
outside the health sciences field but are growing in popularity in social sciences due to their ability to 
examine complex problems to provide credible, evidence-based solutions for policymaking (Mallett et al., 
2012; Petticrew, 2001). 
1.2 Research Objective & Questions 
This study aims to contribute to knowledge about critical infrastructure resilience by systematically 
reviewing relevant scholarly literature, analyzing its major and minor themes, and identifying future 
research directions. Given the substantial research conducted on the topic of critical infrastructure and 
reislience there is an opportunity to establish common themes and research gaps among the existing 
knowledge. The initial research objective seeks to explore critical infrastructure resilience more broadly 
to synthesize understanding of the case. As such, the following research questions were developed to 






1. How is CI resilience conceptualized in the scholarly literature?; 
2. What is the current state of knowledge and extant research findings of CI resilience? 
3. What are the necessary future research directions to further advance knowledge of CI resilience? 
1.3 Thesis Organization 
This thesis comprises of six chapters. Chapter two (Literature Review) is divided into three parts. 
The first part provides an introduction to the literature surrounding critical infrastructure and the evolution 
of critical infrastructure protection in policy and scholarly literature. The emphasis on critical 
infrastructure protection has limited the understanding of how to reduce the overall societal impacts from 
CI disruptions which has called for an evolution from the concept.  
The second part provides the academic origins and development of resilience and an introduction 
into the concept of critical infrastructure resilience. Although the concept of resilience emerged in 
different disciplines, it has been adopted by many research disciplines and adapted to understand and 
address growing issues specific to certain research fields. Critical infrastructure resilience was introduced 
in the last decade as the perspectives and approaches to managing risks to CI have evolved. The concept 
of CI resilience is relatively new and many fundamental questions remain unanswered. The research 
surrounding the concept is growing and there is little consensus on several aspects of the term, such as 
how it is defined, how it is assessed and how it can be enhanced in practice.  
The third part provides an introduction into systematic reviews, their evolution from health 
sciences literature to other fields and the research gaps in systematic reviews of CI resilience. Systematic 
reviews vary from typical literature reviews as they are designed to locate and synthesize the best 
available evidence related to a specific research question through a specific process to ensure 
transparency and reproducability of the research study. Although systematic reviews are less common 
outside of the field of health sciences, they are growing in popiularity due to their ability to systematically 
review a topic area, synthesize a large amount of information to establish a comprehensive understanding 
of a concept and assist in decision-making for policymakers and practioniers by providing them with 





Chapter three (Methodology) describes the systematic review process in detail, which investigates 
the research questions. The methodology chosen for the objective of this research was a systematic review 
as they are regarded as the most effective means to synthesize information from multiple research sources 
with similar research questions. They follow a standard methodology to ensure they are reproducible and 
they examine a collection of documents selected based on clearly defined and defensible criteria. The 
researcher used the guidance and steps pioneered by Boland et al., (2017). In addition, the Preferred 
Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) method was also utilized and 
adapted for a qualitative systematic review due to its popularity and each step of the methodology follows 
this guidance to ensure a high degree of transparency and quality reporting. Descriptive and thematic 
analyses were executed for the planned methods of synthesis and analysis. A descriptive analysis provides 
a thorough descriptive account of the field of study for the reader to understand the research. The thematic 
analysis draws insights from patterns in the data to identify key themes and was guided by the six-phases 
of thematic analysis pioneered by Braun & Clarke (2006).  
Chapter four (Results) synthesizes the research findings in two parts: a descriptive and thematic 
analysis. The descriptive analysis provided results which included a table of methodological 
characteristics, including research pecularities, objectives and keywords. Furthermore the descriptive 
analysis results found that the publication dates of the data range from 2006 to 2020 with most of the 
dataset’s publication dates in the last three years. The study locations of the dataset are almost exclusively 
in the Global North, with most of the data coming from the United States. The journal types are focused 
in the engineering field with some indication of interdisciplinary analysis of the concept in other research 
fields such as human geography, disaster management and political sciences. The methodology of the 
data is split almost evenly between qualitative and quantitative data with a much smaller proportion of 
research utilizing mixed methods.  
Chapter four (Results) also presents several results from the thematic analysis, The first part goes 
over the following themes: defining CI resilience, types of CI, risks to CI and types of CI resilience. The 
results indicate that the definition of resilience remains more closely linked to the original definition from 
the engineering and physics field and emphasizes the protection of and minimization of impacts on 
physical structures. The research places an over-emphasis on technical resilience despite the indication 
that there should be a shift towards societal resilience. The research focuses primarily on physical risks to 
CI and there is limited analysis of non-physical risks to CI such as cyber-attacks and political threats. The 





conducted analyzing the resilience of other vital CI sectors such as healthcare, emergency services and 
food production and distribution.  
The second part of the thematic analysis discusses the following themes: enhancing CI resilience, 
assessing CI resilience, case studies, frameworks and research gaps. The primary focus across the 
literature for enhancing CI resilience is technical solutions and there is indication of a hesitancy to discuss 
and analyze non-technical solutions such as regulation and other public policy tools. Although the 
research indicates some consensus surrounding the best indicators for assessing resilience based on some 
redundancy in the results, there is no confirmed consensus among the academic literature or real-life CI 
operation. The case studies in the literature focus entirely on the Global North and around the assessment 
of risk or enhancement of CI resilience based on physical hazards, focusing on the power, transport and 
water infrastructure sectors. The frameworks in the data are primarily quantitative, focusing on technical 
solutions to CI resilience, and there was limited discussion around how the frameworks would be applied 
in real-life and how actors (i.e. CI owners or operators, policymakers or practioners) could mobilize the 
frameworks. There were several research gaps presented in the literature, primarily that CI resilience 
remains studied predominately in technical fields which limits the knowledge and tools that can be 
utilized and adapted from other fields to assist in problem-solving. Finally, there is limited 
standardization of CI resilience assessment and the application of CI resilience frameworks has not been 
adequately explored.  
Chapter five (Discussion) discusses the findings with the research questions and draws 
connections to Chapter two. Firstly, there is a lack of overlap with other research fields since CI resilience 
is focused in technical fields such as engineering, particularly fields which have substantial knowledge 
which could benefit the development of the concept such as ecology, natural hazards and disaster 
management. The definition of CI resilience requires four components: planning and preparation, 
reduction of impacts, minimal recovery times, and learning and evolution and should focus more so on 
ensuring the provision of vital services and less on the physical structures themselves. There is a narrow 
perspective to risk which focuses solely on physical hazards and does not reflect the growing landscape of 
threats which include several non-physical risks. Furthermore, the risk of climate change and its related 
threats such as flooding and extreme weather, are an ever-present threat which will continue to pose a risk 
to communities and there is further need to understand how natural hazards impact CI resilience. There is 
an over-emphasis on technical solutions to CI resilience and extremely limited research exploring and 





responsibility for CI resilience on the private sector, as most CI sectors globally are now privately owned 
and managed, and for this reason do not necessarily explore the responsibility of other stakeholders such 
as the public sector, the academic community, and consumers. Finally, there is no industry or academic 
consensus on the best methods for assessing the resilience of CI.  
Finally, Chapter six (Conclusion) summarizes the research objectives, questions, methodology 
and findings and concludes with future research directions. Future research directions include the need to 
conduct more geographically diverse CI resilience research as the current research focuses almost entirely 
on the Global North, and specifically the United States. Future research should focus more on societal 
resilience by analyzing how social capital and networks can reduce the social and economic losses from 
disruptions to CI. There should be analysis conducted to understand the degree to which CI is at risk due 
to climate change and what measures, tools and technologies must be in place to ensure the resilience of 
CI. Non-physical hazards, such as cyber-attacks and political threats, should be the focus of future Ci 
resilience research to capture the wide range of risks posed to CI in modern society. CI sectors such as 
healthcare, emergency services, food production and distribution and essential manufacturing should be 
studied to understand their current degree of resilience in various regions and communities globally. 
Future research should examine and analyze the public policy tools in place aimed at enhancing CI 
resilience to provide a better understanding of non-technical solutions and their efficacy. Finally, 
additional systematic reviews of CI resilience should be conducted to further academically develop the 






Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Part 1: Critical Infrastructure and Resilience 
This literature review chapter is divided into three parts. The first part provides an overview of the 
current state of knowledge of critical infrastructure and a history of CI management in the North 
American context. The second part outlines the evolution of the concept of resilience and the connection 
to other fields. The third part describes the current state of knowledge of systematic reviews outside the 
fields of health sciences, particulary focusing on CI and resilience and outlines research gaps in the topics 
of CI resilience which would benefit as a result of a formal systematic review process.  
1. Critical Infrastructure 
Critical infrastructure in modern society can be understood as “buildings, facilities, systems or 
networks essential for maintaining the vital functions of a society, and the health, safety, security and 
economic and social well-being of the community, whose cessation or destruction would have a 
significant impact” (Curt & Tacnet, 2018, p.2441). Critical infrastructure is also the “central nervous 
system of the economy in all countries” and will not only allow for the functioning of a society but can 
contribute to an enhanced economy and social development (Yusta et al., 2011, p.6100). The dominant 
sectors are energy, water, transport, information and communication technology, health, food supply, 
banking and finance, government services, safety and emergency services. Canada and the United States 
supply a much longer list of CI sectors provided in Table 1 and 2, respectively.  
Scholarly analysis and review of critical infrastructure is relatively recent and the dominant 
literature on this topic is concentrated within policy documents and legislation. The concept of “critical 
infrastructure”  emerged in the early to mid-90s due to the growing threat of terrorism to North America 
and the scholarly literature slowly followed in the early 2000s. For example, the executive order that 
defined critical infrastructure in the United States was established in 1996 and listed eight infrastructure 
sectors considered “vital” to national security. Similarly, in 2001 the Government of Canada published 
the National Framework on Critical Infrastructure Protection and Effective Management. In 2009, the 
National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure was established and defined CI as “those physical and 
information technology facilities, networks, services and assets, which if disrupted or destroyed, would 
have a serious impact on the health, safety, security or economic well-being of Canadians or the effective 





Canada’s established ten CI sectors including transportation; manufacturing; safety; water; food; 
government; energy & utilities; communication and information technology; finance; and healthcare.  
Table 1: Canada Critical Infrastructure Sectors (Quigley, 2013) 







Energy and Utilities 




















Table 2:  United States CI sectors (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2020) 










Food and Agriculture 
Government Facilities 
Healthcare and Public Health 
Information Technology 
Nuclear Reactors, Materials and Waste 
Transportation Systems 
Water and Wastewater Systems 
 
Evolution of Threats to Global Critical Infrastructure 
Initial discussion surrounding threats to CI was focused predominately on physical threats such as 
war and terrorism. As policy and scholarly literature around critical infrastructure has evolved, so has the 
understanding of the risks that pose a threat to CI functioning. Additional physical threats to global CI 
include extreme weather events, natural disasters, pandemics, and other disruptive forces that can cause 
its collapse or degradation. In 2012, Hurricane Sandy flooded roads and tunnels, which disrupted New 
York’s subway lines, leaving many without transportation, and resulted in electricity shortages for 8.5 
million households (OECD, 2019). More recently, the global pandemic of COVID-19 has had 
unprecedented impacts on global health systems, resulting in the overwhelming increase of 
hospitalizations in intensive-care units (Phua et al., 2020). In addition, non-physical threats such as cyber-
attacks and political threats, such as the privatization of CI industries, deregulation, and fiscal austerity, 





 Physical Risks 
The early political debates surrounding the protection of CI centred on war and terrorism-related 
threats. The 1997 United States presidential report, for instance, stated that “while poor design, accidents, 
and natural disasters may threaten our infrastructures, we focused primarily on hostile attempts to 
damage, misuse, or otherwise subvert them” (Staff et al., 1997, p.14). The emphasis on war and terrorism 
was further reinforced in North American policy discussions and development following the terrorist 
attacks of 9/11, despite scholarly discourse that identified a wider range of threats to CI. Similarly, 
European policy development around CI protection occurred only after several terrorist attacks in 
European countries.  
Canada’s CI policies stem from an earlier period during the second world war (Boyle & Speed, 
2018). At that time, governments recognized the importance of vital systems such as transportation, 
water, and energy, as well as their interconnections, and their potential to disrupt society if impacted. This 
recognition rose to a national security concern during the second world war as the United States and 
Canada became increasingly concerned about aerial bombardment and nuclear strikes. Canada’s approach 
during this time was a centralized, government-led protection strategy established through the War 
Measures Act in 1914. The War Measures Act empowered the federal government to “exercise sweeping 
emergency powers upon declaration of ‘war, invasion, or insurrection, real or apprehended’” (Boyle & 
Speed, 2018, p.219).  Scholarly literature on this topic has focused on investigating the probability and 
potential impact of terrorist attacks on various CIs, particularly transportation infrastructures such as 
airports and subway systems, which are deemed attractive targets for attacks (Farahani et al., 2019).  
From 2016-2021, the incidence of natural disasters has increased by two percent annually (Osei-
Kyei et al., 2021). The increased occurrence and intensity of natural disasters have been identified as a 
significant threat to CI in the literature. Flooding and its threats to CI is a significant focus area of natural 
hazards research as it is the most common and wide-reaching natural hazard globally and the third most 
damaging natural hazard after storms and earthquakes (Wilby & Keenan, 2012). Flooding has resulted in 
costly and deadly impacts due to the increasing concentration of population and wealth in urban areas 
(Rehman et al., 2019). Climate change is altering many of the Earth’s cycles, changing the frequency and 
intensity of natural hazards, mainly flooding, wildfires and droughts, and these factors are driving more 
natural disasters globally (Van Aalst, 2006). Understanding how flooding impacts on CI has emerged as 





infrastructure impacts. For example, Deshmukh et al. (2011) concluded that the severity of impacts from 
the 2009 US Midwest floods resulted from weak infrastructure and damage to bridges, roads, power 
plants, water, and wastewater plants. Gordon & Little (2009) asserted that the actions following Hurricane 
Katrina in the form of government-led disaster relief funds perpetuated a cycle of inadequate preparation 
for CI disruption to flooding events. Miller et al. (2018) reported that the hurricane season in 2017 was 
the most devasting in history, resulting in $290 billion in damages to CI in the United States.  
As extreme flooding events become more frequent and intense, the scholarship cannot capture the 
breadth of damage occurring to CI globally. There are countless examples of flooding events, their 
impacts on CI and the subsequent socioeconomic effects on impacted communities. Hurricane Katrina has 
been a popular focus of research into the intersection of flooding and CI. It was an extreme example of 
the severity of the impacts of flood exposure to weak CI. As extreme hurricanes have been increasing 
over the past decade, the research area is becoming more prominent among scholars. In particular, the 
case study of Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico has now emerged as a scholarly focus. Puerto Rico suffered 
greatly as a result of Hurricane Maria due to weak and poorly managed CI. Most deaths resulted from the 
lack of power in health care systems, weak health care networks that could not ensure medication 
delivery, and contaminated wastewater  (Klein, 2019). Two months after the hurricane, less than half of 
the 3.4 million residents had regained their electric power (Miller et al., 2018). Additionally, Hurricane 
Harvey in Texas resulted in several oil spills and the release of chemical contamination in the surrounding 
environment (Osei-Kyei et al., 2021). Murdock et al. (2018) outlined the growth of global flood damage, 
which is expected to total around the US $52 billion by 2050, much of which involves damage to CI such 
as power outages, traffic delays and flooded trains. 
 Another significant physical threat to CI discussed in the literature is the ageing of infrastructure, 
as much of the current infrastructure is old or has antiquated components that significantly increase 
vulnerability. Much of the CI equipment globally was constructed following World War II and has not 
been upgraded or updated. Furthermore, erosion due to the progression of climate change and the 
increased demand for CI services in urban areas are additional factors contributing to the ageing of 
infrastructure. Scholars have noted that these factors have accelerated the erosion and ageing of CI (Osei-
Kyei et al., 2021). Due to ageing infrastructure, there is a risk of amplified impacts from external threats 







In addition to tangible, physical risks to CI globally, several relevant non-physical risks pose a 
significant threat to adequate protection of global CI. The non-physical threats include cyber-attacks and 
political threats such as growing fiscal austerity and de-regulation of CI industries. 
As technology has advanced in the last few decades, CIs such as smart grids, air traffic, 
transportation, electricity and nuclear power plants have become increasingly dependent on digital control 
systems and networking resources (Osei-Kyei et al., 2021). Due to the increasing dependence on 
technology, CI is no longer isolated and is typically connected in a “system-of-systems” environment, 
relying on public networks, such as the internet, to ensure functionality and productivity. As a result of 
the technological interconnection between CI globally, they have become attractive targets for cyber-
attacks, and scholars have noted the increased frequency of cyber-attacks (Genge et al., 2015). The 
exploitation of the technology that CIs rely on can lead to severe and dangerous impacts. Due to the 
complexity of the network systems, cyber-attacks remain a major challenge to prevent and they are 
therefore a significant threat to CI (Han et al., 2019).  
Furthermore, CI systems have become more complex and interconnected and, due to widespread 
privatization and deregulation of essential public services, have become more institutionally fragmented 
in many sectors (de Bruijne & van Eeten, 2007). In Canada, for example, this includes the partial 
privatization of Hydro One--the primary electricity services provider--the privatization of Highway 407, 
and the emergence of “privatization creep” into many healthcare services  (Levac & Wooldridge, 1997). 
As economic activities have become increasingly globalized, networks have become more 
interdependent, while institutions that manage CI sectors have become more fragmented, resulting in 
increased vulnerability (Michel-Kerjan, 2003). A power outage that occurred in northern Ohio in 2003, 
for instance, triggered cascading power failures in southeastern Canada and eight states in the United 
States, which affected other CI sectors, including energy, communications, financial, healthcare, food, 
water, transportation, safety, government, and manufacturing. An underlying factor that led to a 
widespread failure included inadequate communication channels between connected CI sectors resulting 
from fragmented authority (OECD, 2019). 
Increasing austerity in nations has starved publicly owned institutions of resources to effectively 





United States is privately owned and controlled (Murray & Grubesic, 2012). Significant challenges for CI 
protection globally include cyber-attacks as well as the political threats such as the privatization and 
subsequent institutional fragmentation of many CI sectors, the rollback of regulations and fiscal austerity, 
and these pressures make it difficult for private actors managing CI to understand the risks and undertake 
protection measures  (de Bruijne & van Eeten, 2007; May & Koski, 2013).  
Management of Critical Infrastructure 
Critical Infrastructure Protection 
The importance of CI protection has increased due to the global evolution of interconnected 
economies and free trade which has resulted in a world where shocks to infrastructure systems in one 
region can create cascading global impacts (OECD, 2019). Furthermore, a failure of an entire system in 
one country can create dangerous consequences across other CI systems within the same region. Policy 
discussions around critical infrastructure and its protection began in the 1990s in the United States. In 
1996, former United States President Bill Clinton began a national study to understand the vulnerabilities 
of national CI and critical assets. The conclusions from the report found that CI was at serious risk due to 
the lack of warning systems to protect against imminent danger, poor communication-sharing between 
government and industries operating CI and limited government research and development budget for 
understanding CI risk (Michel-Kerjan, 2003; Robinson et al., 1998).  Following the terrorist attacks on 
September 11, 2001, the United States established executive orders for CI protection (CIP) which led 
many other countries to undertake research surrounding risk to their own CI and how to protect it 
(Wiseman & McLaughlin, 2014).  
  In both Canada and the United States during the Second World War governments recognized the 
importance of “vital systems” such as transportation, water and energy, their interconnections, and their 
potential to disrupt society if impacted. Canada’s approach during this time was a centralized, 
government-led protection strategy established through the War Measures Act in 1914. The War 
Measures Act allowed the federal government to “exercise sweeping emergency powers upon declaration 
of ‘war, invasion, or insurrection, real or apprehended’” (Boyle & Speed, 2018, p.219). Canadian CIP 
evolved following the establishment of the Emergency Measures Organization (EMO) in the late 1950s, 
later renamed Emergency Preparedness Canada (EPC) in 1975, and the repeal of the War Measures Act in 





understanding of vital systems and the potential threats that contributed to their vulnerability expanding 
beyond just war.  The establishment of the Emergencies Act and Emergency Preparedness Act (EPA) in 
1988 was the conceptual shift from physically protecting locations or assets to restoring operations of 
organizations and governments following a disaster otherwise referred to as business resumption 
(McConnell, 1998). In 2001, the Government of Canada published a national framework on Critical 
Infrastructure Protection and Effective Management that was composed of five pillars:  
1. Putting the Government of Canada’s infrastructure and emergency management house in order 
2. Enhancing and establishing sustainable federal and national partnerships 
3. Enhancing the national operational capability 
4. Implementing effective, targeted programs  
5. Strengthening the policy framework (Eggleton, 2002) 
 
Critical Infrastructure Stakeholders 
During this time, the scholarly literature outlined four relevant stakeholder groups in the field of 
CI protection: 1) the government, which is responsible for ensuring security, public safety, economic 
wellbeing and the continuation of government services; 2) the private sector, which is mainly responsible 
for the operation of CI sectors; 3) the academic community, which researches different fields around CI 
protection and; 4) the consumers of the CI services, which expect the continual operation of their vital 
services without interruption (Abele-Wigert, 2006). There is significant scholarly debate surrounding the 
responsibility for CI protection. Widespread neoliberal and free-market ideologies encourage de-
regulation by government entities, as proponents assert regulation hinders the success of privately owned 
and controlled goods and services. Furthermore, proponents of the same ideologies note that market 
forces and voluntary action are sufficient at ensuring an adequate supply of goods and services to meet 
the required demand (Lewis, 2005).  
As many CI sectors globally transitioned to become privately-owned and controlled, scholars 
noted that the free-market ideologies come directly into conflict with CI protection. Firstly, even if a CI 
sector is privately owned and operated, it still provides a vital service required to ensure the operation, 
security and well-being of society and the economy. Proponents argue that vital services should be 





forces can not effectively manage their provision (Lewis, 2005). Second, in the absence of government 
intervention ensuring CI protection, private actors do not receive benefits for public safety and well-
being. They can externalize threats, indicating that relying on private actors alone is not enough to ensure 
adequate CI protection (de Bruijne & van Eeten, 2007).  
However, scholars also note that there are many limitations to expecting governments to take on 
sole responsibility of managing CI during crises. In the event of disasters and crises, the public 
expectation is that governments will respond to ensure the protection of CI, but there are many barriers to 
government’s working alone, such as fiscal constraints and necessary collaboration with private sector CI. 
Governments initially established all policy and regulation which seeks to ensure CI protection but 
increasingly privatized CI sectors, market liberalization, and limited involvement by governments into the 
private sector in countries such as the United States has led to significant ambiguity around which 
stakeholder has the authority over CI. Even in Canada and the EU, there is some ambiguity around the 
responsibility for CI and the indication that there is a sizeable voluntary responsibility for the private 
sector to act. Although there is a public perception that the government is solely responsible for the 
provision of vital services, scholars indicate that they likely lack the authority, resources, and knowledge 
to effectively do so during a crisis or disaster. In research and in practice, there is a lack of explicit 
coordination between the four stakeholders identified and each group’s specific roles and responsibilities 
for CI protection (Pursiainen, 2018). 
Defining “Criticality” 
A significant limitation and criticism to understanding and mobilizing CI protection in the initial 
literature was the lack of understanding around the definition of “criticality.” Scholars identified that the 
conceptualization of “critical” infrastructure or assets was varied and regionally specific. In the absence 
of a defined concept, it is challenging to analyze policies and practices for their efficacy and presented a 
significant obstacle to academic, as well as practical, dialogue  (Dunn, 2005; Metzeger, 2004). The lack 
of consensus around what is critical has little academic discussion since different groups cannot agree on 
what the problem is and what precisely CI sectors need to be protected (Metzeger, 2004). Furthermore, 
defining a particular number of sectors as “critical” glossed over the reality that CI sectors are in actuality 
interconnected, which results in significant interdependencies across sectors that must be understood 





socio-political issue since the degree to which damage to society due to disruption or disaster to CI was 
acceptable is a political question and not a technical question (Dunn, 2005).  
Metzeger (2004) presented two different understandings of criticality. The first is criticality as a 
symbolic concept related to its role or function in society. An example is a national landmark, such as the 
White House, which is necessary to ensure government services and security policy objectives . The 
second is criticality as a systemic concept related to its function in the broader system of infrastructures 
such as the importance of electric power to ensure the operation of other critical services. Furthermore, 
the author posits that the systemic understanding of criticality is more relevant to every day life since the 
symbolic understanding criticality is more closely related to the identity of a nation or national pride and 
less relevant to the security and well-being of society (Metzeger, 2004).  
Critical Infrastructure Protection Policies 
Early policy and scholarly literature surrounding CI focused primarily on protecting physical 
assets defined as critical, including protecting the physical structures, crisis prevention, and contingency 
planning (Pursiainen, 2009). The goal of CI protection is to “understand and prevent cascading failures 
that can trigger major nationwide disruptions of entire infrastructures and industries” (Ghosh, 2011, p.174 
). The emergence of the term CI protection originated in engineering and information technology which 
sought to understand how to protect closed systems from damages resulting from disruptions (Metzeger, 
2004). Real-life examples that emerged from original CI protection literature to prevent crises from 
occuring include measures such as the Dutch flood protection systems and the segregation of birds 
infected with avian flu (Boin & McConnell, 2007). Contingency planning involved the “specification of 
roles and responsibilities; the allocation of materials, equipment and information systems, and the testing 
of systems under trial conditions” (Boin & McConnell, 2007, p. 53).  
Scholarly literature indicates a characteristic that exists commonly between initiatives associated 
with CI protection is that they rely strongly on anticipation for managing risk. To effectively anticipate a 
threat to CIs, it is imperative to understand the properties and the probability of such a threat occurring 
and the scope of effective responses to prevent harm from occurring. Scholars criticize allocating efforts 
and resources towards an anticipatory approach to preventing harm to CI as it takes away resources that 
could be put towards strategies which are more capable of handling unanticipated threats (de Bruijne & 





events and disasters effectively. Notably, Clarke (1999) proposes that planning for crises can overlook 
and disregard many unique challenges that emerge from disaster events. Planning for crises is essential 
but is considered not sufficient for adequate CI protection.  
As significant policy around CI emerged globally and focused primarily on protection, scholarly 
literature, particularly in social sciences, presented widespread criticism of the concept due to its technical 
emphasis. A fundamental problem identified across the literature is that CI protection was academically 
developed and understood in highly technical and scientific contexts but then introduced into political 
agendas without developing the concept in a socio-political context (Metzeger, 2004). Exclusively 
understanding the quantitative crisis thresholds for CI is not enough to adopt adequate risk reduction 
strategies or protection policies, because “understanding and reducing vulnerability does not demand 
accurate predictions of the incidence of extreme events” (Metzeger, 2004, p. 204). The lack of 
perspectives of CI at the early stages of its political conceptions from socio-political and behavioural 
science contexts limited the understanding of the problems surrounding CI, barriers and challenges and 
the holistic solutions for effective risk management.  
Furthermore, the usage of the term protection implies an “all or nothing” mentality where the 
infrastructure is either protected or not protected from threats which is not suitable for modern 
infrastructure vulnerabilities. Therefore scholars recommend the use of terms from natural sciences such 
as resilience, robustness, and adaptive capacities as they are more appropriate to address the complexity 
of CI (Metzeger, 2004). Historically, technical disciplines such as engineering and information 
technology have dominated the literature surrounding CI and CI protection. The focus on the technical 
aspects of CI protection has limited understanding of the topic (Abele-Wigert, 2006). Early literature on 
CI protection has almost entirely neglected the socio-political dimensions and was not integrated into 
many different disciplines, limiting the overall understanding of the complexity of the challenges which 
posed a threat to adequate protection of CI (Abele-Wigert, 2006).  
Overall, the emergence of CI protection in technical and engineering contexts limited the 
understanding of how to reduce societal impacts from CI disruptions by emphasizing the anticipation and 
prevention of disruptions. The focus on the protection of CI has omitted the necessity for effective, 
proactive planning and resilience of CI. As CI protection strategies have evolved, scholarship indicates 
that resilience principles must be emphasized alongside physical asset protection, crisis prevention, 







The word “resilience” originates from the Latin word resilio which means to jump back. The term 
was first established as a scientific concept in material physics in the 19th century. It was understood as a 
material’s ability  to absorb energy when stressed and return to its original form after the stress was 
released (Bergström et al., 2015). It was then developed as an ecological concept and adapted to social 
systems with further developments applying the concept more broadly to the complex and interconnected 
socio-ecological systems (Zhou et al., 2010). The term “resilience” was popularised in in the ecological 
field through the foundational work of Holling, (1973) who explored how different behaviours in 
ecological systems can result in different approaches to managing resources. Resilience initially was 
understood as a system’s ability to absorb disturbances and then return to its equilibrium (Bhamra, 2011). 
Holling introduced the concept of resilience in his paper which explored the relationship between 
resilience and stability and described change models in the structure and function of ecosystems. 
Holling’s definition is now known as ecological resilience which is how much a system could be 
perturbed without shifting into a novel regime (Walker et al., 2006). 
The term was further developed, extended to other research disciplines, and formalized as either 
“ecological resilience” or “engineering resilience”. In each discipline, many definitions of resilience have 
been used and proposed. Specifically in ecology, the term has been used in two contexts. One is the 
ability and time needed for an ecosystem to return to pre-disturbance conditions. The other is the original 
definition, which measures the systems' ability to absorb disturbances while maintaining the exact 
relationships between populations in the system. Ecological resilience can be composed of four attributes: 
scale, adaptive capacity, thresholds, and alternative regimes (Baho et al., 2017). Although some ecologists 
believe that resilience measures how soon a system returns to a previous state after a disaster, this 
understanding of resilience is now understood as engineering resilience. Academically, the measurement 
of engineering resilience has been thoroughly developed and well understood but the quantitative 
measurement of ecological resilience has been underdeveloped.  
Resilience has been most prominent in sciences such as psychology and ecology. The psychology and 
health sciences fields adopted the concept as a subject’s ability to thrive despite adversity in the 1970s 
(Bergström et al., 2015, p.33). However, it has increasingly been employed in political science, business, 
sociology, history, disaster planning, urban planning and international development (Martin-Breen & 






The concept of resilience has also emerged in fields such as safety science. The definition was 
adapted from the origin in engineering to address safety concerns. Safety science literature emphasizes 
that resilience is the ability to maintain normal operations during disturbances and that a failure-free 
environment is possible through engineering resilience. Furthermore, engineering resilience scholars 
highlight that the most vital characteristics for a complex sociotechnical system are adaptive capacity and 
flexible response to unanticipated events (Bergström et al., 2015).  
It has been adapted frequently in different disciplines and remains as a shared conceptualization of the 
term resilience (Zhou et al., 2010).  The literature alludes to the lack of cohesion and unification between 
resilience definitions across different research disciplines. Despite the breadth of resilience definitions 
and frameworks, the literature indicates three established frameworks for the concept: engineering 
resilience, systems resilience, and resilience in complex adaptive systems (Martin-Breen & Anderies, 
2011).  
Engineering resilience is the ability to bounce back after some type of stress occurs. Engineering 
resilience can apply at the individual level, where a person can recover emotionally and psychologically 
after experiencing varying degrees of stress or applied technically. An engineered systems such as 
buildings, bridges and other infrastructure can endure stresses and return to its regular operative goals. A 
limitation identified with this type of resilience is that on certain occasions the objective is not to return to 
an equilibrium or previous state but rather to change and evolve. Systems or individuals that change after 
stresses can still classify as resilient (Martin-Breen & Anderies, 2011).  
Systems resilience is maintaining system function(s) even when the system experiences stresses or 
disturbances. Although the definition of essential system functions can vary due to region or scale, there 
are several fixed functions required for human survival and well-being such as food, water, and medical 
care. For example, this type of resilience focuses on ensuring certain functions can be maintained such as 
government services following terrorist attack or electricity services during a winter storm. A limitation 
identified with this type of resilience is that even if certain essential functions cannot operate, some 
systems have the adaptive capacity to ensure survival. Through behaviours such as self-organizing in 






Finally, resilience in complex adaptive systems is the ability to learn from disturbances and stresses to 
develop new ways for the system to operate to improve its ability to cope with future disturbances, which 
can mean that the system structure can change and the system can continue. A vital principle of this type 
of resilience is transformability which is the ability for the system to change and perform a new function 
(Martin-Breen & Anderies, 2011). 
Resilience is also understood to be the function of the vulnerability and adaptive capacity of the 
system. The vulnerability of a system is a system’s susceptibility to harm, or more broadly is a system’s 
exposure to threats, external stresses and the degree to which the system is affected by the threats and its 
capacity to respond to threats. Furthermore, adaptive capacity is a system’s ability to respond to a threat 
and evolve to accommodate the threats or changes, including establishing a new system equilibrium or 
stability domain. An additional component to the concept of adaptive capacity is learning from 
disruptions to better cope with future unknown threats.  Fiksel (2004) proposes four characteristics that 
determine resilience: diversity, efficiency, adaptability, and cohesion described in further detail in Table 
3. 
Table 3: Four major system characteristics that contribute to resilience (Fiksel, 2004) 
System Characteristic Details 
Diversity The existence of multiple forms of behaviour 
Efficiency Performance with modest resource consumption 
Adaptability Flexibility to change in response to new pressures 
Cohesion Existence of unifying relationships and linkages 
between system variables and elements 
 
The fields of  climate change and natural hazards adapted the concept of resilience to help understand 
how to address several growing issues. Scholarly literature criticizes policy approaches that rely heavily 
on short-term and technological fixes as they fail to address the broader issue of system resilience. A 
challenge in improving resilience for complex problems like climate change is understanding how 
improving one stressor can impact the broader system. For example, a coastal town experiencing sea-level 
rise due to coastal erosion might take action to improve that individual problem by directing investments 





actions that improve overall resilience, improving their overall adaptive capacity. Climate change presents 
a unique challenge to resilience as it is nonlinear. There are progressive changes not expected by systems 
which emphasize the need for transformability for resilience. Utilizing responses based on past 
experiences can limit the perspective for resilience solutions and reduce future options. Furthermore, an 
analysis of system stressors and responses for the issue of climate change globally concluded that in the 
context of climate change, factors such as top-down governance structures, the limited connection 
between actors of different scales and problems framed as technical with short term horizons severely 
reduced the resilience of the impacted system (Adger et al., 2011).  
Scholarly literature indicates that resilience is an essential characteristic for communities to reduce 
vulnerability to natural hazards. Furthermore, scholars note that the most traditional definition of 
resilience that is measured based on a system’s ability to return to a previous state after a disaster is 
undesirable in the context of natural hazards. The previous state impacted by a natural disaster has proved 
itself as vulnerable and therefore it is not desirable to return to a previous state as it would remain 
vulnerable to future disasters. Resilience to natural hazards is more closely related to later definitions of 
resilience which focus on improving the functioning of systems and measures resilience based on the 
ability of the system to learn and adapt from disasters to increase their capacity to cope with future events. 
A significant criticism of resilience in scholarly literature is that there are many different definitions of the 
term across disciplines. The implication is that the concept is confusing and difficult to operationalize in 
practice. Rather than an observable and measurable definition, the term has become an umbrella concept 
for a multitude of system characteristics deemed desirable. Without an explicit and measurable definition, 
resilience remains a vague concept of interpretation instead of a practical policy or management tool (R. 
J. T. Klein et al., 2003).  
 Natural hazards are a concrete example of a threat that has frequently occurred in an unprecedented 
manners due to their occurrence and severity. Although specific preventative measures are taken, future 
disasters cannot be prevented from occurring in form, magnitude and location. Therefore, human systems 
must be able to recover effectively from disasters, which makes resilience an essential concept in natural 
hazards and disaster research. Vulnerability assumes the potential for loss in a system by accounting for 
the likelihood of exposures and susceptibility to damage. The varied definitions include Turner et al. 
(2003), who define vulnerability as the degree to which a system could experience harm as a result of a 






Disaster resilience is the ability to resist and recover from the loss caused by an extreme natural event 
with the shortest possible time with limited external assistance. Disaster resilience is assessed using pre- 
and post-disaster data and improves the abilities of the system to resist and recover from hazards. In 
contrast, vulnerability focuses more on the pre-disaster data to understand the exposure and sensitivity of 
the system and assists in preparation for future disasters. Disaster resilience includes two properties: 
inherent resilience and adaptive resilience. The former is determined by the structure and functions of the 
system during normal circumstances, and the latter is the system’s ability to resist and recover from 
disasters and assesses the system's ability to learn from the disaster and evolve (Zhou et al., 2010). 
Furthermore, disaster management literature emphasizes the concept of societal resilience, which is a 
shift towards a local and decentralized responsibility for safety and security within a community that 
includes all sectors of society: all levels of governments, businesses, the non-government sector and 
individuals (Bergström et al., 2015). For example, Sweden launched a campaign called “72 hours,” which 
aims to ensure all households and businesses can remain self-sufficient for the first 72 hours after a crisis 
or disaster and similarly. “Get Ready Queensland” in Australia is a similar campaign which involves a 
network connecting households, business and government to enhance societal resilience during bush fire 
season (Bergström et al., 2015).  
3. Critical Infrastructure Resilience                                           
“Critical infrastructure resilience” has emerged in scholarly literature in the last decade or so, but 
many fundamental questions about the concept remain (Rød et al., 2020). Due to the emergence of CI 
literature in the engineering field, the classic approaches to crisis and risk management focused too much 
on a “scientific process” where it was necessary to know all relevant variables and develop optimized 
solutions. For this reason, scholars introduced the concept of CI resilience which seeks to go beyond 
traditional risk management approaches by taking into account unexpected events. In contrast, CI 
protection historically focused almost exclusively on anticipated events and preparing and preventing 
them (Labaka et al., 2016; Lindblom, 1959). The relevancy of managing the impact of natural disasters on 
CI has facilitated the transition into integrating resilience into CI literature as disaster research strongly 
indicates that societal resilience, which is the resilience of citizens, first responders, and operational 
commanders, is needed for effective response during disasters (Barton, 1969; Dynes, 1970; Drabek, 
1986). Furthermore, as the lack of coordination of roles and responsibilities between the four stakeholders 





social and economic wellbeing of society. Societal resilience seeks to enhance the capacities of various 
actors (households, businesses, governments and non-government actors) to better cope with and recover 
from disasters through education and cooperation with the public and private sectors (Bergström et al., 
2015). 
The integration of resilience into CI academic literature has been discussed for the last decade. 
However, the integration between the two concepts remains limited, and a robust and fundamental 
understanding of “critical infrastructure resilience” is a significant research gap (Rød et al., 2020). Some 
scholars have proposed what CI resilience might look like, such as enhanced risk assessment tools, 
analytical frameworks that model CI resilience and private-public partnerships focused on regional 
approaches (Egli et al., 2019). Others have proposed that CI strategies to enhance societal resilience 
include preparing first responders, business continuity planning, the collaboration between communities 
and private owners of CIs, joint preparation, joint training, and training leaders (Boin & McConnell, 
2007). Murray and Grubesic (2012) propose a “Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Information 
Sharing Environment,” which provides both tools and a secure system for allowing infrastructure 
providers to “share information, develop improved security protocols, evaluate risk, respond to events and 
enhance CIKR resilience” (p. 63). 
Although there is some research on CI resilience, there is little consensus on how exactly it is defined, 
how it is assessed, and how it can be enhanced in practice. The historical literature on CI protection, 
which was more preventative and anticipatory, has provided substantial insights into protecting society 
from threats. However, there is an opportunity to understand how CI resilience is being framed and 
discussed in the literature to establish the connection between the two concepts to further advance 







Part 2: Systematic Reviews 
1. Systematic Review 
A systematic review differs from a typical literature review. It is designed to locate and synthesize the 
best available evidence related to a specific research question, advance a research field, and make 
decisions about policy development and other interventions for change. Systematic reviews are 
considered the most effective means to synthesize information from multiple research sources with 
similar or identical research questions (Boland et al., 2017). Features that differentiate the systematic 
review from other forms of the literature review are its standardized methodology, which ensures it is 
reproducible, and the selection of documents and sources based on clearly defined and defensible criteria 
(Berrang-Ford et al., 2015; Boland et al., 2017). Steps required in a systematic review are the “definition 
of the question or problem, identification and critical appraisal of the available evidence, synthesis of the 
findings and the drawing of relevant conclusions” (Boland et al., 2017, p.2). Systematic reviews improve 
on traditional literature reviews because they assist in reducing implicit researcher bias since they adopt 
broad search strategies, predetermined search strings and uniform inclusion and exclusion criteria. They 
require that the research includes and reviews studies outside of their subject areas and networks. 
Traditional literature reviews also focus more on the results of studies without considering design, data, 
and methods, whereas systematic reviews incorporate analysis of the evidence, impact, validity, and 
causality of studies.  
When executed effectively, systematic reviews have an obvious advantage over traditional literature 
reviews. They improve transparency, include a greater breadth of studies, require more objectivity and 
reduction of implicit bias and encourage researchers to think more critically with the quality of evidence 
(Mallett et al., 2012). Systematic reviews are considered a “rigorous method to map the evidence base in 
an as unbiased way as possible and to assess the quality of the evidence and synthesize it”  (Mallett et al., 
2012, p.446). Systematic reviews are usually peer-reviewed and have recently been associated with 
research networks such as the Cochrane Collaboration for medicine and the Campbell Collaboration for 
education, crime and justice and social welfare. The objective of these research networks is to minimize 
bias, reduce duplication of research, keep the reviews updated and provide a library of all the reviews in 







2. Systematic Reviews outside of Medicine 
Systematic reviews are typically utilized as formal, strictly standardized review papers in health 
sciences and fewer than one percent of systematic review documents in the Web of Science database 
focus on areas outside of health sciences (Boland et al., 2017). Systematic reviews were first applied in 
the medical sciences in the 1970s but have been growing in popularity in research fields outside of 
medicine (Mallett et al., 2012). Although social scientists have expressed the need to review literature 
without bias, the prevalence of systematic reviews in fields outside of medicine has only emerged in 
recent years (Petticrew, 2001). The increased interest in using systematic reviews outside of health 
research has been primarily due to the need to improve decision-making for policymakers and 
practitioners by providing them with detailed, evidence-based research to assist in the process (Mallett et 
al., 2012).  
The limited use of systematic reviews outside of medicine is likely because they are contentious in 
the social science community for various reasons. One example of criticisms include the notion that 
systematic reviews prioritize a particular research methodology (e.g. randomized controlled trials), which 
is not prevalent in other research fields, such as social sciences. Other reasons include the inability for 
systematic reviews to synthesize crucial data which utilizes complex interventions and multiple outcomes. 
There is also currently no room for theory to play a role in the review, primarily since a theory of change 
guides social research. Scholars suggest multiple guiding principles for systematic reviews outside of the 
medical field such as developing methods for reviewing complex issues, interventions and outcomes. 
Furthermore, scholars suggest ensuring the review provides evidence that can be easily accessed and used 
by policymakers, practitioners, and public members. Hence, they use the best information to inform their 
decisions (Nagyova, 2015).  
There is a common misconception that systematic reviews are the same as traditional reviews and that 
they simply review a large amount of content, but they are not just reviews of large quantities of 
literature, and the objective of the methodology is not to provide a “comprehensive review.” Their 
objective is to answer a specific question, reduce bias, appraise the quality of included studies, and 
summarize them objectively. An additional misconception is that systematic reviews are of no relevance 
to the “real world” since systematic reviews are focused primarily on disease outcomes in medicine and 





the complex outside social world. However, systematic reviews have examined complex and contentious 
policy and social issues and provide credible, evidence-based solutions for policymaking (Petticrew, 
2001). For example, systematic reviews analyzed whether spending more money in schools can improve 
educational outcomes, if job absenteeism is an indicator of job dissatisfaction and whether there is an 
association between poverty, income inequality and violence (Petticrew, 2001) 
In the field of international development, for example, many donors are under pressure to spend 
money on practices that result in increased development and humanitarian outcomes. For these reasons, 
there has been an increased interest in “evidence-based policymaking,” which uses empirical evidence in 
the design of policies and programmes in developing countries (Mallett et al., 2012). Due to the 
systematic review’s rigorous and transparent literature review, many fields outside medicine have been 
increasingly using systematic reviews (Petticrew 2001).  
Many systematic reviews address natural hazards and have been published in medical journals to 
quantify health impacts to justify and inform other strategy and policy actions. Since natural hazards 
typically result in many health impacts to a region, medical literature includes an extensive synthesis of 
physical and mental health impacts from flooding (Doocy et al., 2013). Additionally, reviews of tools to 
manage the health impacts of natural hazards have been conducted, such as understanding the role of 
occupational therapists in emergency response and analyzing gender disparity in the impacts of hazards 
with objectives of quantifying and reducing health impacts from natural hazards (Parente et al., 2017; 
Sohrabizadeh et al., 2014). Medical literature provides a solid basis for conducting and executing 
systematic reviews that are replicable, and the researcher will use them as a reference for the design of the 
methodology. 
The topic of disaster risk reduction (DRR) is prevalent among systematic review literature in 
natural hazards due to the urgent need to understand and reduce natural disasters (Aghaei et al., 2018). 
Systematic reviews on DRR have focused on consolidation and analysis of topics such as effective DRR 
education strategies, understanding behaviour that might result in an increased risk of impacts as well as 
assessing governance and management of pre-disaster planning (Aghaei et al., 2018; Ahmed et al., 2018; 
Raikes et al., 2019).  Another critical theme in systematic reviews for DRR is the tools to assess social 
impacts effectively and quantify economic impacts of disasters to guide efficient strategy formulation 
(Eckhardt et al., 2019; Sohrabizadeh et al., 2014). Additionally, Eckhardt et al. (2019) provided new 





Disaster management, distinct from but related to DRR, is a topic area seemingly common among 
systematic reviews of natural hazards. The systematic reviews in this topic area have sought to define the 
term “disaster management,” as there is no consensus around the definition in academic literature (Lettieri 
et al., 2009). Additional systematic reviews have sought to improve the modelling of natural hazards to 
better forecast and communicate future disasters (Anshuka et al., 2019). There has been a thorough 
analysis of DRR and disaster management topics among systematic review literature of natural hazards. 
 Three concepts assessed in systematic reviews of natural hazards include vulnerability, resilience 
and adaptation. Specifically, systematic reviews of natural hazards related to vulnerability pose questions 
about defining and assessing vulnerability to natural hazards, which is vital for implementing adaptation 
and improving resilience (Patel et al., 2017). Some systematic reviews have sought to further understand 
vulnerability by reviewing methods used to determine flood vulnerability and identify specific indicators 
to measure social vulnerability in disasters (Fatemi et al., 2017; Rehman et al., 2019).  
 There are only three systematic reviews that focus on flood risk management (FRM), two of 
which were published in 2019. Reducing the impacts from flooding historically followed a resistance-
based approach, composed of principles such as protection, response and recovery (Morrison et al., 2019; 
van Popering-Verkerk & van Buuren, 2017). Flood management has evolved into a more holistic, 
resilience-based approach composed of principles such as flood prevention, defence, mitigation, 
preparation and response, and recovery (Henstra & Thistlethwaite, 2017; Morrison et al., 2019). 
Systematic reviews in this field have sought to define resilience as a concept in FRM literature to 
operationalize it better, understand the current status of flood risk perception and communication as 
sufficiently synthesize methodological information from community FRM strategies in the United States 
(Kellens et al., 2013; McClymont et al., 2020; Sadiq et al., 2019). Despite the need for improved FRM 
among communities and the understanding of effective operationalization of the concept, there is a 
limited synthesis of academic literature regarding this topic, particularly in Canada, where flooding is the 
most dangerous and costly natural hazard that is worsening due to climate change. 
3. Research Gaps in Systematic Reviews of Critical Infrastructure Resilience 
Despite its emergence in the literature, “critical infrastructure resilience” has yet to be explored using 
a comprehensive systematic review. A systematic analysis of critical infrastructure resilience must 
synthesize the breadth of information and guide evidence-based solutions. Some academic literature 





enhancing CI resilience (Curt & Tacnet, 2018; Mottahedi et al., 2021). In addition, one study reviewed 
the potential threats to building CI resilience (Osei-Kyei et al., 2021).  
 
Since the concept has emerged in academic literature relatively recently, it will be beneficial to 
systematically review this topic area to synthesize the information available to establish a comprehensive 
understanding of the concept. There is a need to establish an understanding of the term in academic 
literature. More specifically, how is CI resilience conceptualized in the scholarly literature? (e.g. how is 
critical infrastructure resilience defined?; what infrastructure is considered critical?; what are the threats 
to CI resilience?); what is the current state of knowledge and extant research findings of CI resilience? 
And what are the necessary future research directions to further advance knowledge of CI resilience? As 
threats such as cyber-attacks, climate change, natural hazards and many more unanticipated risks pose a 
serious threat to the well-being of society, there is a need for an analysis of current strategies and policies  
and their ability to address the growing issue. Furthermore, there is a need to develop and implement 





Chapter 3: Methodology 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the methodology chosen for this research study and provide a 
thorough explanation of the methods undertaken to answer the research questions. The chapter begins 
with an overview of the methods for the search strategy, data collection, and data analysis. 
Research Approach 
The methodological approach chosen to address the objective of this research is a systematic 
review, which is regarded as the most effective means to synthesize information from multiple research 
sources with similar research questions (Boland et al., 2017). There has been limited systematic reviews 
in social and environmental sciences despite the urgent need for a comprehensive synthesis of existing 
research and tools to evaluate progress within critical infrastructure and natural hazards research. The 
methodology is most commonly used to synthesize papers in health sciences; indeed, fewer than one 
percent of systematic review documents in the Web of Science database focus on areas outside of health 
sciences (Boland et al., 2017). A systematic review differs from a traditional literature review. It was 
chosen as the method for this study because it is designed to locate and synthesize the best available 
evidence related to a specific research question and assist in advancing a research field and making 
decisions around interventions and policy development and change. 
Furthermore, systematic reviews follows a standard methodology to ensure they are reproducible, 
and they examine a collection of documents selected based on clearly defined and defensible criteria 
(Berrang-Ford et al., 2015; Boland et al., 2017). A systematic review follows a structured sequence of 
steps, which include: “a definition of the question or problem, identification and critical appraisal of the 
available evidence, synthesis of the findings and the drawing of relevant conclusions” (Boland et al., 
2017, p.2). Additionally, they can reduce the number of sources of information and synthesize critical 
pieces of information to inform essential processes of decision-making, research and policy (Eckhardt et 
al., 2019).  
In this study, the researcher followed a systematic review protocol pioneered by Boland et al. 
(2017), the process for which is laid out in Figure 1. This method was chosen to provide thorough 





process used in healthcare interventions with additional guidance for reviewing qualitative data (Boland 
et al., 2017). 
 
Table 4: The main principles of systematically reviewing qualitative evidence (Boland et al., 2017) 
Main Principles of Qualitative Synthesis Description 
1. Plan review Planning review to understand how to best use time and resources 
available 
2. Perform scoping searches, define review questions and 
inclusion and exclusion criteria, and write protocol 
Carrying out scoping searches to help identify background 
literature will help you define and refine your review question 
and set your inclusion and exclusion criteria. A protocol must 
also be written which enables a researcher to set out the approach 
that will be used to answer review question(s) 
3. Literature searching Identifying evidence (published and unpublished) using 
bibliographic databases and other evidence sources that can be 
used to answer the research question(s) 
4. Screening titles and abstracts Reading titles and abstracts of the studies identified and 
discarding ones that are not relevant to the review question(s) and 
keep relevant ones 
5. Obtaining papers Obtaining full text-papers of the evidence identified in Step 4 
6. Selecting full-text papers Applying inclusion criteria to full-text papers and excluding ones 
that do not fit the criteria 
7. Data extraction Identifying relevant data from each paper and summarizing data 
using forms or tables 
8. Quality assessment Assessing each included full-text paper for methodological 
quality using an appropriate quality assessment tool 
9. Analysis and synthesis They are scrutinizing and synthesizing data, either narratively or 
through meta-analysis. 
10. Writing up, editing, and disseminating Writing up background, methods, and results, discussing findings, 
concluding the review, and disseminating findings. 
  
The Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) method 
strengthens the validity and quality of the systematic review (PRISMA, 2020). The PRISMA method is a 
27-item checklist intended to ensure the highest degree of transparency and quality reporting in 
qualitative research (Welch et al., 2016). Since the PRISMA method has had limited application outside 
of medical research and quantitative analysis, the researcher adapted the checklist based on its precepts 
and several recent papers which applied the qualitative analysis method for this study. The adapted 





Welch et al., 2016). The researcher utilized the guidance from Boland et al. (2017) to support the 
guidance of the overall methodological process. However, due to the centrality of the PRISMA approach 
among systematic reviews, the following section describes, in detail, each step outlined in the checklist 
provided above to ensure a high degree of transparency and quality reporting in this systematic review.  
 
Table 5: PRISMA item checklist. Adapted from (Fayette & Bond, 2018; Moher et al., 2009; Welch et al., 2016) for a qualitative 
systematic review. 
Section and Topic  Item # Checklist item  
PRISMA Protocol for Qualitative Review in Social Sciences 
TITLE 
Title  1 Identify the report as a systematic review. 
ABSTRACT 
Abstract  2 See the PRISMA 2020 for Abstracts checklist. 
INTRODUCTION 
Rationale  3 Describe the rationale for the review in the context of existing knowledge. 
Objectives  4 Provide an explicit statement of the objective(s) or question(s) the review addresses. 
METHODS 
Eligibility criteria  5 Specify the inclusion and exclusion criteria for the review and how studies were grouped for the syntheses. 
Information sources  6 Specify all databases, registers, websites, organizations, reference lists, and other sources searched or consulted to 
identify studies. Specify the date when each source was last searched or consulted. 
Search strategy 7 Present the complete search strategies for all databases, registers, and websites, including any filters and limits. 
Selection process 8 Specify the methods used to decide whether a study met the review's inclusion criteria, including how many reviewers 
screened each record and each report retrieved, whether they worked independently, and, if applicable, details of 
automation tools used in the process. 
Data collection process  9 Specify the methods used to collect data from reports, including how many reviewers collected data from each report, 
whether they worked independently, any processes for obtaining or confirming data from study investigators, and, if 
applicable, details of automation tools used in the process. 
Data items  10 List and define all outcomes for which data were sought. Specify whether all results that were compatible with each 
outcome domain in each study were sought (e.g., for all measures, time points, analyses), and if not, the methods used to 
decide which results to collect. 
Synthesis methods 11 Describe the processes used to decide which studies were eligible for each synthesis (e.g., tabulating the study 
intervention characteristics and comparing against the planned groups for each synthesis (item #5)). 
11a Describe any methods used to synthesize results and provide a rationale for the choice(s). If meta-analysis was 
performed, describe the model(s), method(s) to identify the presence and extent of statistical heterogeneity, and software 
package(s) used. 
RESULTS 
Study selection  12 Describe the search and selection process results, from the number of records identified in the search to the number of 
studies included in the review, ideally using a flow diagram. 
Results of syntheses 13 For each synthesis, briefly summarise the characteristics among contributing studies. 
DISCUSSION 
Discussion  14 Provide a general interpretation of the results in the context of other evidence. 












PRISMA Method Checklist  
Step 7: Search Strategy  
The researcher collected peer-reviewed journal articles for the systematic review from two 
research databases: Web of Science (Web of Science) and Scopus. The researcher selected the “all 
fields,” selection and set the time period to 1900-2020. The initial search term of “critical infrastructure 
resilience” yielded 106 documents in Web of Science and 120 documents in Scopus (n=226). After 
removing duplicates, the final dataset before applying inclusion and exclusion criteria included 80 
scholarly articles.  
Table 6: Overview of the search strategy in Web of Science and Scopus 
Database Keywords Used Search Results 
Web of Science “critical infrastructure resilience” 
 
106 
Scopus “critical infrastructure resilience” 
 
120 
TOTAL  226 
 
Step 8: Selection Process 
The researcher vetted the scholarly articles for inclusion using the following criteria: (1) 
published in the English language; (2) peer-reviewed; and (3) linked to the research objective (i.e., the 
objective and findings of the research indicate that it is exploring, understanding, and analyzing one or 
more critical infrastructure sector(s) and indicate the exploration of the term ‘resilience’). Studies 
excluded from the research study included the following criteria: (1) published in non-English language; 
(2) not published in peer-reviewed academic journals; and (3) not linked to the research objective (i.e., 
article purpose or findings did not offer important information or data to address any of the research 
questions). For example, some scholarly articles did not specify analysis of critical infrastructure sectors. 





or ‘protection.’ Furthermore, some articles were highly technical. The researcher deemed their findings 
not relevant or substantial for inclusion in the dataset.  
Table 7: A description of the inclusion and exclusion criteria applied to the initial set of articles 
Inclusion Criteria Exclusion Criteria 
English language Non-English language 
Peer-reviewed journal article Not a peer-reviewed journal article 
Linked to the research objective Not linked to the research objective 
 
After applying the inclusion and exclusion criteria, 31 articles were not linked to the research 
objective; 5 articles were not published in peer-reviewed journals, and five articles were not available to 
the researcher to access. The final list of articles included in the research was 39. There is no consensus 
around the minimum number of papers that are ideal for a systematic review. However, Boland et al. 





researchers should feel confident that the final number of articles is sufficient for inclusion in the review. 
Figure 1 illustrates the search strategy and selection process executed for this research study.  
Figure 1: The PRISMA framework for selecting articles (Haddaway & McGuinness, 2020). 
Step 9: Data Collection Process 
The data from the articles were collected initially through independent data extraction. 
Independent data extraction involves identifying and extracting relevant data from the included papers 
and then storing it in a single format (a data table or form) (Boland et al., 2017). The individual researcher 
extracted data and recorded it into a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. Independent data extraction indicates 
there was no second person to “cross-check” the data extraction and verify the data is accurate and 
complete (Boland et al., 2017). The individual researcher verified the data extraction as accurate and 
complete by setting the data extraction table aside for a week and completing the data extraction again to 






Step 10: Data Items 
The data items extracted from each article included author, title; keywords; research problem; 
research problem; and principal findings and results. Additional data items extracted were publication 
year, study location, journal of publication; methodology; and research gaps outlined by the article 
authors. 
Step 11: Planned Methods of Synthesis and Analysis 
Descriptive and thematic content analysis of the data extracted was utilized to thoroughly analyze 
data, synthesize primary outcomes, draw vital common themes, and inform future research and practice. 
The descriptive and thematic analyses process consisted of four phases: reviewing the extracted data for 
common themes, developing a codebook, coding text excerpts, and identifying insights and themes across 
coded data. 
Descriptive Analysis 
A descriptive analysis provides a thorough descriptive account of the field of study for the reader 
to understand the research (Tranfield et al., 2003). The descriptive analysis clarifies the main 
characteristics of the articles in the dataset, such as methodologies used, study location and keywords 
(Lettieri et al., 2009).  
Thematic Analysis 
Thematic analysis is a method of organizing data and drawing insights from patterns in the data to 
identify key themes. It builds on the descriptive analysis as it provides more detail and a complex account 
of the data.  A thematic analysis provides the reader with an overview of key themes and emergent 
themes as a means to report the state of knowledge in the field of study, and a central purpose is to inform 
a future research agenda (Braun & Clarke, 2012; Maguire & Delahunt, 2017; Tranfield et al., 2003). 
Themes identified as “key” or “emergent” in the thematic analysis process are determined based on their 
prevalence and frequency across the dataset and their relevancy and importance concerning research 
questions. This research followed established methods for inductive thematic analysis of qualitative 
research (Braun & Clarke, 2006, 2012) and guidelines for the thematic synthesis of qualitative research 





Braun & Clarke (2006) provide a six-phase approach to thematic analysis, outlined in Table 8. 
Thomas & Harden (2008) provide guidance for a three-stage approach: 1) coding text; 2) developing 
descriptive themes, and 3) generating analytical themes (Thomas & Harden, 2008). As these approaches 
to thematic analysis are similar, the Braun & Clarke six-phase approach will be employed to ensure a 
robust and informed analysis of the data.  
 
Table 8: The phases of thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006) 
Phase Description of Process 
1. Familiarizing yourself with your data Reading and re-reading data, noting down initial ideas 
2. Generating initial codes Coding exciting features of the data in a systematic fashion across 
the entire dataset, collating data relevant to each code 
3. Searching for themes Collating codes into potential themes, gathering all data relevant to 
each potential theme 
4. Reviewing themes Checking if the themes work in relation to the coded extracts (Level 
1) and the entire dataset (Level 2), generating a thematic ‘map’ of 
the analysis 
5. Defining and naming themes Ongoing analysis to refine the specifics of each theme and the 
overall story the analysis tells, generating clear definitions and 
names for each theme 
6. Producing the report The final opportunity for analysis. Selection of vivid, compelling 
extract examples, the final analysis of selected extracts, relating the 
analysis to the research question and literature, producing a 
scholarly report of the analysis. 
 
The Six Phases of Thematic Analysis 
a) Data familiarization 
The first step in the thematic analysis process is to become familiar with the data through repeated, 
active reading and taking notes that will support coding in the later steps (Braun & Clarke, 2006). To 
understand the data, the researcher read each journal article and noted the following information in a 





During the reading and note-taking, the researcher used an additional document to record patterns and 
observations from the data familiarization process to inform the subsequent steps. 
b) Generating initial codes 
Following the data extraction sheet review, the researcher employed a deductive approach to build a 
coding tree of semantic themes for qualitative content analysis in NVivo. The researcher used NVivo to 
upload the research articles, create and save nodes and categorize the data. Nodes are a collection of 
references referring to a specific theme, place, person or other area of interest (QSR International, 2021). 
After the researcher concluded the research questions, they derived several sub-research questions 
informing the broader coding tree in Appendix B. The researcher then read through each journal article 
and coded text sections that complied with the nodes developed. After reading, the researcher added 
codes inductively when a new code was needed to capture an essential or valuable piece of information 
(Braun & Clarke, 2012). The researcher deemed a new code essential or valuable if it contributed to any 
of the research questions presented. For example, while reading the articles, the researcher found several 
patterns within the terms used in the definition in resilience, so the node was revised with several sub-
nodes to properly reflect these patterns (e.g., adaptation, recovery, disruption, and preparation). Another 
example of a revision is the initial sub-nodes for the node “types of resilience”: ecological, engineering, 
complex adaptive systems, and social, determined based on the literature review. After reading the 
articles, the researcher found that these terms were not used to discuss types of resilience and revised the 
sub-nodes accordingly to social, technical, organizational, and economical.  
c) Searching for themes 
A key or emergent theme is determined through the prevalence and frequency within the dataset and 
captures something important concerning the research questions (Braun & Clarke, 2006). This phase 
requires analyzing the codes, identifying broader topics or issues and determining how the codes might be 
combined to form overarching themes (Braun & Clarke, 2012). The researcher reviewed all the coded 
data and identified similarities between codes. Similar codes were plotted in a thematic map and clustered 
based on an overarching theme.  
 
d) Reviewing themes 
The researcher refined the themes in two stages. First, the researched reviewed the coded data extracts 
to assess if they formed a coherent pattern. Their relevancy refined themes to research questions, the 





(Braun & Clarke, 2012). Some themes did not have enough data to support them, and the researcher chose 
to not include them in the results. The researcher collapsed other themes into each other due to their 
similarity. The final review involved re-reading the data to ensure the themes identified meaningfully 
captured the data in a way that answered the research questions. 
e) Defining and naming themes 
This phase requires the final refinement of themes presented in the final analysis and data analysis 
within each theme (Braun & Clarke, 2006). The fundamental principles guiding this phase are ensuring 
the presented final themes: a) have a singular focus; b) are related but do not overlap so they are not 
repetitive; and c) directly address research questions (Braun & Clarke, 2012, p.66). The researcher 
reviewed the thematic map developed from the previous phases and determined which themes were most 
relevant to answer the research questions based on the principles provided above and identified the story 
each theme presented. The researcher used the frequency of coded text sections within each node as a 
critical determinant of relevancy in answering the research question. The final themes presented are the 
most commonly coded themes within the dataset. The final step in this phase was to determine the most 
relevant themes to present to ensure all research questions and review the themes to develop a coherent 
narrative presented in the Discussion chapter (Braun & Clarke, 2006, 2012). 
f) Producing the report 
The purpose of this phase is to present the analytical narrative of the dataset for the reader to ensure the 
merit and validity of the analysis with a concise, logical and exciting presentation of the data (Braun & 
Clarke, 2006). The final analysis and write-up of this thematic analysis is in the Results and Discussion 
chapters. These sections will outline the story of the data with sufficient and vivid examples of evidence 






Chapter 4: Results 
This chapter presents the results of the systematic review. The first part of the chapter is the 
descriptive analysis providing an overview of the general parameters of the dataset. The second part of 
the chapter provides an overview of the major themes derived from the dataset to provide an in-depth 
understanding of the current state of knowledge and extant research findings of critical infrastructure 
resilience. Following the methodology described in the previous chapter, the significant themes described 
in Part 2 are based on the coding tree in Appendix C and were the most frequently discussed themes. 
4.1 Descriptive Analysis 
This section describes the methodological characteristics of the articles in the dataset. The characteristics 
of the articles in the dataset are the following: 
1) Research peculiarities, objectives and keywords 
2) Publication date 
3) Study locations 
4) Journal types 
5) Research methodologies 
Each of these characteristics is discussed in detail in the following five sections of the Descriptive 












• Research Overview 
• Keywords 
This table provides an overview of all details of the dataset that was used to inform the coding and analysis.  
  
Table 9: Summary of study qualities, descriptions and research overview of all articles included in the dataset 
Number Authors Title Year Research Overview Keywords 
1 Applegate, CJ; Tien, I Framework for Probabilistic 
Vulnerability Analysis of 
Interdependent Infrastructure Systems 
2019 This paper applies a novel framework to model 
interdependent water and power infrastructure 
networks.  
  
2 Bloomfield, RE; Popov, P; Salako, K; 
Stankovic, V; Wright, D 
Preliminary interdependency analysis: 
An approach to support critical-
infrastructure risk-assessment 
2017 This paper presents a methodology to analyze the 
interdependencies between CI. 
Interdependency analysis, risk 
assessment, cascading failure, CIR 
3 Boin, A; McConnell, A Preparing for CI Breakdowns: The 
limits of crisis management and the 
need for resilience 
2007 This paper presents a set of strategies for citizens, 
front-line workers and CI owners/operators to 
enhance societal resilience following a disaster. 
  
4 Brown, C; Seville, E; Vargo, J Measuring the organizational resilience 
of critical infrastructure providers: A 
New Zealand case study 
2017 This paper presents a methodology to assess the 
organizational resilience of CI providers using a 
case study in New Zealand. 
Organizational resilience, CIR, 
Benchmarking resilience, measuring 
resilience, resilience indicators 
5 Cedergren, A; Johansson, J; Hassel, H Challenges to critical infrastructure 
resilience in an institutionally 
fragmented setting 
2018 This paper explores the implications of a CI 
organization following disturbances in a multi-
organizational setting impacted by deregulation 
using a case study of the Swedish railway system. 
CI, resilience, recovery, institutional 





6 Clark, S.S., Seager, T.P., Chester, M.V. A capabilities approach to the 
prioritization of critical infrastructure 
2018 This paper aims to demonstrate the use of a 
capabilities approach to determine the criticality 
of CI and argue that the most critical CI are the 
ones that are essential for providing or supporting 
human capabilities. 
CI, Infrastructure services, capability 
approach, human development, 
infrastructure criticality, Maslow's 
hierarchy of needs 
7 Comert, G; Pollard, J; Nicol, DM; Palani, 
K; Vignesh, B 
Modelling Cyber Attacks at Intelligent 
Traffic Signals 
2018 This paper presents a model to quantify the 
impacts of cyber--attacks on intelligent traffic 
signal components. 
  
8 Croope, SV; McNeil, S Improving Resilience of Critical 
Infrastructure Systems Postdisaster 
Recovery and Mitigation 
2011 This paper presents a framework (Critical 
Infrastructure Resilience Decision Support 
System) that models all the variables involved in 
improving CI resilience and seeks to reduce the 
vulnerability by offering insight into the trade-
offs and opportunities involved to reduce damage 
and costs following a disaster. 
  
9 Curt, C; Tacnet, J-M The resilience of CI: review and 
analysis of current approaches 
2018 This paper is a literature review that presents the 
different dimensions of resilience, the current 
limitations to assessing and managing resilience 
and proposes future research directions to 
improve the field of resilience management. 
CI, disaster, resilience 
10 Cutts, M; Wang, YM; Yu, QS New Perspectives on Building 
Resilience into Infrastructure Systems 
2015 This paper presents the 2014 Cascadia 
Earthquake Readiness Workshop findings with 
government and industry individuals to examine 
new perspectives to improve resilience in critical 
infrastructure systems in the Pacific Northwest 
region. 
  
11 de Bruijn, KM; Maran, C; Zygnerski, M; 
Jurado, J; Burzel, A; Jeuken, C; 
Obeysekera, J 
Flood Resilience of Critical 
Infrastructure: Approach and Method 
Applied to Fort Lauderdale, Florida 
2019 This paper demonstrates how a discussion 
between government employees, research 
agencies, CI operators and managers and shared 
insights can improve resilience through 
developing a shared understanding of CI 
disruption and collaboratively developing 
solutions and introducing a novel indicator of 
resilience: "person disruption days." 
resilience, flood risk management, 
critical infrastructure 
12 Dick, K; Russell, L; Dosso, YS; Kwamena, 
F; Green, JR 
Deep Learning for Critical 
Infrastructure Resilience 
2019 This paper applies deep learning and machine 
vision as possible technological solutions to 
improve CI resilience. 
  
13 Dormady, N; Roa-Henriquez, A; Rose, A Economic resilience of the firm: A 
production theory approach 
2019 This paper applies a framework to an 
organization to improve its resilience to supply 
shortages and price changes to provide a basis for 
analyzing large-scale supply chain resilience.  
Economic resilience, production theory, 






14 Egli, DS; Donohue, BH; Waddell, RL; 
Contestabile, JM; Cosgrove, JB 
Operationalizing Critical Infrastructure 
Resilience 
2019 This paper presents a qualitative framework for 
CI resilience which is meant to inform local and 
regional planners and government officials and 
the private sector to ensure broader and holistic 
community resilience. 
  
15 Espada, R; Apan, A; McDougall, K Vulnerability assessment of urban 
community and critical infrastructures 
for integrated flood risk management 
and climate adaptation strategies 
2017 This paper presents a quantitative framework 
integrating disaster risk reduction and climate 
adaptation to assess flood risk on CI and improve 
flood risk management issues. 
Risk analysis, infrastructure, 
vulnerability, flooding, built 
environment, capacity 
16 Fang, YP; Sansavini, G Optimum post-disruption restoration 
under uncertainty for enhancing critical 
infrastructure resilience 
2019 This paper presents a quantitative model which 
can assess the repair time and resources required 
to improve the resilience CI and is demonstrated 
through the case study of the British electric 
power system. 
CI, system resilience, restoration 
planning, uncertainty, stochastic 
programming 
17 Fekete, A CI and flood resilience: cascading 
effects beyond water 
2019 This paper presents a framework that integrates 
disaster risk management and CI resilience 
concepts  
CI, disaster resilience, flood 
management, flood risk, flood risk 
management 
18 Garschagen, M; Sandholz, S The role of minimum supply and social 
vulnerability assessment for governing 
critical infrastructure failure: current 
gaps and future agenda 
2018 This paper investigates how the assessment and 
mitigation of social vulnerabilities and the 
implementation of minimum supply standards for 
CI can reduce the negative impacts of CI 
disruption. 
  
19 Johansen, C; Tien, I Probabilistic multi-scale modelling of 
interdependencies between critical 
infrastructure systems for resilience 
2018 This paper analyzes the interdependencies 
between CI to understand better how to restore 
services and result in fewer damages using a 
novel Bayesian network model. 
CIR, interdependencies, Bayesian 
networks, probabilistic modelling, risk 
assessment 
20 Kozine, I.O; Trucco, P; Petrenj, B Resilience capacities assessment for 
critical infrastructures disruption: the 
READ framework (part 1) 
2018 This paper presents a capabilities-based 
framework for improving the resilience of CI. 
CI, resilience assessment, capability-
based planning, emergency 
management, public-private 
partnership, gap analysis 
21 Krishnamurthy, V., Huang, B., Kwasinski, 
A., Pierce, E., Baldick, R. 
Generalized resilience models for 
power systems and dependent 
infrastructure during extreme events 
2020 This paper presents a quantitative framework to 
assess the resilience of CI. It focuses specifically 
on assessing electrical power and 
telecommunications due to its high criticality 
during extreme events. 
  
22 Labaka, L; Hernantes, J; Sarriegi, JM A holistic framework for building 
critical infrastructure resilience 
2016 This paper presents a novel qualitative 
framework for improving the resilience of CI 
with detailed prescriptions for various 
stakeholders such as CI operators, government 
officials, emergency responders and other 
external agents.  
Crisis management, CI, resilience, 






23 McDonald, M; Mahadevan, S; Ambrosiano, 
J; Powell, D 
Risk-Based Policy Optimization for 
Critical Infrastructure Resilience 
against a Pandemic Influenza Outbreak 
2018 This paper presents a decision-making model 
using system dynamics to model different 
scenarios following a pandemic influenza 
outbreak. 
  
24 Murdock, HJ; de Bruijn, KM; Gersonius, B Assessment of Critical Infrastructure 
Resilience to Flooding Using a 
Response Curve Approach 
2018 This paper presents a quantitative method for 
assessing CI resilience based on several novel 
indicators in Toronto, Canada.  
Resilience, CI, quantifications, impact 
assessment, risk reduction, flood risk 
25 Nazarnia, H; Sarmasti, H; Wills, WO Application of household disruption 
data to delineate critical infrastructure 
resilience characteristics in the 
aftermath of a disaster: A case study of 
Bhaktapur, Nepal 
2020 This paper presents a novel framework for 
assessing resilience quantitatively using CI 
service disruption data and applies it to a case 
study in Bhaktapur, Nepal 
Resilient city, disaster resilience, 
disruption data, civil infrastructure 
systems, emergency response 
26 Ouyang, M; Chuang, L; Min, X Value of resilience-based solutions on 
critical infrastructure protection: 
Comparing with robustness-based 
solutions 
2019 This paper compares four mathematical models 
to quantify the difference in implementing 
resilience-based solutions vs. robustness-based 
solutions for CI  
CIP, robustness, resilience, worst-case 
malicious attack, natural hazards 
27 Pant, R; Thacker, S; Hall, J.W.; Alderson, 
D; Barr, S 
CI impact assessment due to flood 
exposure 
2018 This paper presents a quantification of CI 
resilience to flooding using the indicator of 
disrupted customers due to direct impact (i.e. 
electricity customer dependent on electricity 
asset) and disrupted customers due to indirect 
network impacts (i.e. telecommunications 
customer dependent on electricity assets) 
CI, customer disruptions, flood 
catchment, flood hazard, infrastructure 
networks, risks, vulnerability 
28 Pursiainen, C Critical infrastructure resilience: A 
Nordic model in the making? 
2018 This paper analyzes the strategic approach to CI 
resilience in four Nordic countries (Denmark, 
Finland, Norway and Sweden) and highlights the 
everyday trends and differences.  
CI, resilience, civil protection, crisis 
management, the Nordic model 
29 Rachunok, B; Nateghi, R The sensitivity of electric power 
infrastructure resilience to the spatial 
distribution of disaster impacts 
2020 This paper demonstrates the use of a quantitative 
metric (spatial distribution of disasters) to assess 
the resilience of CI. 
  
30 Ridley, G National Security as a Corporate Social 
Responsibility: Critical Infrastructure 
Resilience 
2011 This paper argues that CSR researchers and 
practitioners should extend the scope of CSR 
research to incorporate CI resilience and 
acknowledge that due to the large-scale 
privatization of CI, the resilience of CI is a 
significant modern CSR issue. 
British railway industry, case study, 
corporate social responsibility, critical 
infrastructure resilience, essentially 
contested concepts, Microsoft 
Corporation, national security 
31 Robert, B., Morabito, L., Cloutier, I., 
Hémond, Y. 
Interdependent critical infrastructures 
resilience: Methodology and case study 
2015 This paper presents a novel qualitative approach 
(coherence analysis) to assess the resilience of 
CI. 
Case study, resilience, coherence 
analysis, CI, protection, hazards 
32 Rod, B; Lange, D; Theocharidou, M; 
Pursiainen, C 
From Risk Management to Resilience 
Management in Critical Infrastructure 
2020 This paper builds on existing risk management 
standards to incorporate CI resilience and 
CI, organizational resilience, 





presents a more standardized approach to 
improving CI resilience.  
resilience, risk management, resilience 
measurement, resilience assessment, 
resilience analysis, resilience evaluation 
33 Roe, E; Schulman, P.R Toward a comparative framework for 
measuring resilience in CI systems 
2020 This paper presents a quantitatively assessing 
resilience in communities to allow for 
comparative assessment of risks between 
different sectors and communities. 
  
34 Rogers, P. Development of Resilient Australia: 
Enhancing the PPRR approach with 
anticipation, assessment and 
registration of risks 
2011 This paper presents the Australian approach to 
enhancing CI resilience, contrasts it with the UK 
model and highlights the importance of building 
on the current strategy in Australia instead of 
replacing it. 
  
35 Serre, D; Heinzlef, C Assessing and mapping urban resilience 
to floods for cascading effects through 
CI networks 
2018 This paper presents new methods to assess the 
resilience of CI to flooding in urban 
environments. 
Urban flooding, critical infrastructure 
networks, cascading effects, resilience 
strategies, climate change 
36 Tonn, G; Czajkowski, J; Kunreuther, H; 
Angotti, K; Gelman, K 
Measuring Transportation 
Infrastructure Resilience: Case Study 
with Amtrak 
2020 This paper presents a case study conducted with 
representatives of Amtrak (a US passenger rail 
service) in which the representatives reviewed 
metrics of resilience and selected resilience 
activities to serve as the baseline for assessing the 
organization's resilience. 
  
37 van der Merwe, S.E., Biggs, R., Preiser, R. Sensemaking as an approach for 
resilience assessment in an Essential 
Service Organization 
2020 This paper presents a novel indicator for 
assessing CI resilience within an organization 
through the qualitative measurement of 
employee's "sense of coherence."  
CIR, general social resilience, 
sensemaking, sense of coherence, 
resilience capacities, emergency 
exercise 
38 Wei, D; Chen, ZH; Rose, A Evaluating the role of resilience in 
reducing economic losses from 
disasters: A multi-regional analysis of a 
seaport disruption 
2019 This paper presents a framework for the 
quantitative assessment for the resilience of CI 
following the implementation of various 
resilience tactics. 
computable general equilibrium 
analysis, economic consequence 
analysis, port disruptions, resilience to 
disasters, spatial reallocation of 
resources 
39 Zimmerman, R; Zhu, QY; de Leon, F; Guo, 
Z 
Conceptual Modeling Framework to 
Integrate Resilient and Interdependent 
Infrastructure in Extreme Weather 
2017 This paper presents a framework for assessing the 
resilience of CI and, specifically, how 
interdependencies and dependencies influence 






1. Publication Date 
Figure 2 provides a depiction of the publication years of the papers included in the review. Although 
the initial search timeframe was from 1900 to 2020, the final papers' timeframe is from 2006 to 2020. The 
highest number of publications in this review was in 2018 (n=12), and numbers decrease slightly in the 
following years. The results indicate that research surrounding critical infrastructure resilience is a 
relatively new concept in scholarly literature and is still emerging. The increased discussion in the 
academic literature of the concept in recent years is likely due to the realization among governments and 
academic scholars that resilience of CI is necessary to national security and development. For example, 
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has published several reports 
declaring the importance of critical infrastructure resilience as historic critical infrastructure policies have 
not always been effective in challenging the increasingly complex and interconnected global landscape of 
risk. Their reports provide insight into the changing risk landscae and provide guidance for improving CI 
resilience globally (OECD, 2019). Furthermore, prevailing threats such as climate change and natural 
disasters, advanced technology and cyber-attacks, and the severity of CI failures and disruptions have 
drawn the attention of scholars towards CI resilience (Osei-Kyei et al., 2021). The acknowledgement that 
society’s require CI resilience to ensure social, health and economic wellbeing paired with the knowledge 
of the uncertainty of future risks from threats will contribute to the projected increase in research studies 
and scholarly literature of this concept in the coming years (Canada, 2021; OECD, 2019; Osei-Kyei et al., 
2021). 



























2. Study Location 
Figure 3 depicts the study location of the papers included in this review. Twenty-four papers provided 
a specific geographic location for the research focus or a case study within the sample. The study location 
of the papers in this review focuses significantly on the Global North and specifically in North America. 
The United States was the most commonly chosen study location for papers (n=8). The prevalence of 
research studies in the United States is likely due to their interest in protecting CI in the early 21st 
century. The U.S. published its strategies and policies for CI protection in the late 1990s and indicated an 
increased interest following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Northeast blackout in 2003 and Hurricane 
Katrina in 2005 (Petit et al., 2013). 
Furthermore, after the United States published its strategies, other developed countries such as 
Canada and various countries in the European Union (EU) followed shortly through the National Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) and then through the EU following the 2004 Madrid and 2005 London 
terrorist attacks (Pursiainen, 2018). Only one paper in the sample had a study location that was not a 
developed country (Nepal). Although there is no evidence to corroborate precisely why there is limited 
research around CI resilience in developing countries, it could be since there is limited political and 
institutional development of CI resilience strategies in those countries or that many of the papers are 
published in non-English journals or journals that are not indexed in the Scopus and Web of Science 
databases (Osei-Kyei et al., 2021). The limited research in developing countries might also indicate that 
the concept is still undergoing academic development in those regions and will likely lead to future 





better understand how CI resilience applies in those contexts
 














3. Research Field & Journal Type 
Figure 4 depicts the classification of the papers in the review based on the research field. The 
researcher derived the fields from reviewing the descriptions of the journal of publication to identify the 
parameters used by editors to solicit article submissions.  The findings suggest that a large proportion of 
papers remain focused on the engineering field (n=12). Following engineering, human geography (n=7) 
and disaster management (n=5) had the second and third, respectively, the highest number of papers in 
this study. Furthermore, additional fields include political sciences (n=2), natural hazards (n= 3), 
transportation (n=3), environmental sciences (n=3), crisis management (n=3) and business and economics 
(n=2). Within engineering, the most common sub-fields include civil engineering (n=7), reliability 
engineering and systems safety (n=3), industrial engineering (n=2) and electrical engineering (n=1).  
The findings suggest that although the most significant number of papers concentrates on the 
engineering research field, researchers from other fields also study critical infrastructure resilience, and 
the concept is interdisciplinary. This finding indicates that the concept might continue to be studied across 
various research disciplines, bringing additional perspectives to further advance knowledge and provide a 
more holistic understanding of the concept. 
 












































This section depicts the classification of the paper’s methodology in this review (see Figure 5)—an 
almost equal number of papers utilized either quantitative (n=17) or qualitative (n=16) methodology. 
Most papers (n=13) using a quantitative methodology developed and applied a framework with the goal 
of either assessing CI resilience or enhancing it. In addition, several papers using quantitative 
methodologies identified specific indicators which were applied to assess CI resilience or used a Bayesian 
network approach to model infrastructure interdependencies or modelling the impacts of cyber-attacks on 
transportation technology. There is significantly more variation between the papers using qualitative 
methodology, but several frameworks utilize qualitative components to assess or enhance CI resilience. In 
addition, several papers adopted a case study approach by assessing CI resilience policies or strategies in 
countries such as Australia, New Zealand, and the Nordic countries. There was a much smaller proportion 
of papers that used a mixed methodology (n=6). The papers utilized mixed methodologies were all 
published within the last ten years, indicating a more recent evolution into combining qualitative and 
quantitative methods to assess or enhance CI resilience. Furthermore, these papers combined 
methodologies to assess interdependencies between CI, vulnerabilities in infrastructure systems or CI 
resilience. There was one paper that combined qualitative knowledge with the first quantitative indication 
of resilience to improve CI resilience  










Descriptive Analysis Conclusion 
In conclusion, the descriptive analysis provided several insights surrounding the publication date, study 
location, research field and methodology of critical infrastructure resilience research. Two key insights 
emerged from the descriptive analysis. Firstly, the majority of research is focused within the last decade 
indicating the relatively recent emergence of the topic. Furthermore, the results indicate there is an 
acknowledgement that society’s require CI resilience to ensure social, health and economic wellbeing 
paired with the knowledge of the uncertainty of future risks from threats will contribute to the projected 
increase in research studies and scholarly literature of this concept in the coming years. Second, the 
research results indicate that there is a lack of research with study locations outside of the Global North. 
The limited research in developing countries indicates that the concept is being academically developed in 







4.2 Thematic Analysis 
This section presents and describes the major themes identified within the dataset and the 
research objectives and findings of the 39 articles included in the dataset. The following guiding research 
questions, which were developed based on the broader research questions and the literature review, to 
guide the development of the codebook and to conduct the analysis and results.  
Table 10: Guiding research questions developed from the literature review 
Guiding Research Questions 
How is CI resilience being defined? 
How is resilience being measured and assessed? 
What are the objectives for CI resilience? Is it to assess or enhance resilience? 
What type of resilience is being discussed? Ex. Engineering, ecological, social 
What frameworks for CIR are discussed? Are they theoretical or implemented case studies? 
What models are discussed? Are they quantitative or qualitative? Are they applied or theoretical? 
What are the case studies conducted in the research? 
How is vulnerability being defined and framed? Ex. Social vulnerability 
What indicators are being used to measure resilience? 
What risks to CIs are being discussed? Is it an all-hazard or fragmented approach? 
What geographic regions are analyzed in studies? 
How are interdependencies/dependencies assessed? Ex. cascading failures.  
 
The codebook was developed, guided by the “developing initial codes” step in the Six Phases of 
Thematic Analysis (see Methods chapter). The following codebook is the final codebook, revised during 
the coding step. The initial codebook was developed following the development of the guiding reserch 
questions, which is provided in Appendix A. The codebook was analyzed to identify major themes which 










Table 11: The final codebook developed based on the guidance from The Six Phases of Thematic Analysis 
Node Sub-nodes 
Adaptive capacity  
Assessing criticality  
Barriers to resilience  
Business continuity  




Measuring resilience  
Assessing resilience  
Enhancing resilience Capabilities approach 
Public policy tools 
Technical solutions 
Disaster management Flood risk management 
Disaster assessment 








Case studies  
Vulnerability definition Exposure 
Hazard 
Resiliency indicators  
Hazards (to CI) Flooding 
Terrorism 
All-hazard 






Interdependencies/dependencies Cascading failures 
Recovery  
Research gaps  
Risk management  










Climate change  








This section is divided into two parts. The first part describes the major themes in the concepts of 
CI resilience, and the second part describes the major themes across the articles’ research objectives and 
findings which were developed by reviewing the codebook. Both sections begin with a description of the 
number of articles with content coded within each theme. 
4.2.1 Themes among CI Resilience Concepts 
To identify the major themes, a thematic analysis was followed (see Methodology). This section describes 
the four major themes surrounding the conceptualization of CI resilience which includes: 
1) Defining CI resilience (n=29); 
2) Types of CI (n=29) 
3) Risks to CI (n=23); and, 






1. Defining Resilience 
A lack of understanding of “critical infrastructure resilience” has led to criticism that without an 
established definition, widespread use of the term has made it too vague and difficult to operationalize 
(Cedergren et al., 2018; Moteff et al., 2003; Rogers, 2011). Overall, there is some consistency between 
definitions of resilience within the dataset but remains closely linked to 19th century perspectives from 
material physics and engineering. There is some indication within the dataset that there is an evolution 
from the original definition to one that more closely reflects societal resilience emerging from research on 
complex adaptive systems. However, it is not consistent across the CI resilience literature. 
The most commonly incorporated term across the dataset is “recover” (n=19) closely resembling 
the following example: “resilience is the ability to withstand and recover rapidly from disruptions” 
(Krishnamurthy et al., 2020, p.194). The second most referenced term across the dataset is “adapt” 
(n=17). For example, a commonly used definition for resilience across the dataset is “the ability to adapt 
to changing conditions and withstand and rapidly recover from disruptions due to emergencies” (Egli et 
al., 2019, p.424).  Similarly, the colloquial phrase “bounce back” is used across the data et (n=2), such as 
“the ability to ‘bounce back’ after suffering a damaging blow’ (Boin & McConnell, 2007, p.54). The 
general resilience definitions related to recovery and “bouncing back” derives from the origin of 
resilience in material physics and engineering literature, defined as a physical structure’s ability to 
“bounce or spring back into shape or position after being pressed or stressed” (Egli et al., 2019, p.424). 
Most definitions across the dataset using the terms “adapt” and “recover” related to general resilience in 
nature. In contrast, a smaller portion are more specific to CI and refers to either a structure, system or 
function’s ability to adapt or recover from a disruption (Brown et al., 2017; Cedergren et al., 2018; Clark 
et al., 2018; Croope & McNeil, 2011; Curt & Tacnet, 2018; de Bruijn et al., 2019; Kozine et al., 2018; 
Serre & Heinzlef, 2018).   
Definitions that refer to a structure, system, or function’s ability to adapt or recover are already 
more context-specific to CIs and enable better operationalization of the term such as in the example: 
“resilience is the ability of a system to adjust its functioning before, during or following changes and 
disturbances so that it can continue to perform as required after a disruption or a major mishap, and in the 
presence of continuous stresses (Cedergren et al., 2018, p.53). Furthermore, Egli et al. (2019) state that 
resilience is about adapting to and recovering from disruption and improving and getting stronger 





post-disruption such as “repair,” “rebuild,” “reconstruction,” “growth,” and “transformation” are only 
referenced in four articles in the dataset (Dormady et al., 2019; Egli et al., 2019; Fang & Sansavini, 2019; 
Rød et al., 2020). For example, Rod et al. (2020) defined resilience as “the ability of a system, community 
or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate, adapt to transform and recover from the 
effects of a hazard” (p.2). Egli et al., (2019) highlighted that resilience is also “the ability to get stronger 
as a result of adversity and the chance to rebuild out systems so that they have greater functionality and 
efficiency” (p. 424).  
Despite the necessity of planning for effective resilience practices, the literature only references the 
terms “prepare” and “plan” in eight articles in the dataset (Applegate & Tien, 2019; Brown et al., 2017; 
Curt & Tacnet, 2018; de Bruijn et al., 2019; Johansen & Tien, 2018; Kozine et al., 2018; Krishnamurthy 
et al., 2020; Murdock et al., 2018).  Curt & Tacnet (2018) provided a definition that encompasses all four 
components by asserting resilience involves four capacities: “to plan and prepare for the adverse events, 
to reduce the impact of events, to minimize the time to recovery and to evolve through the development 
of specific processes (Curt & Tacnet, 2018, p.2443). Similarly, de Bruijn et al. (2019) described a resilient 
system as one that can: “1. prevent frequent events from causing negative impacts; 2. mitigate impacts of 
rare events, so they do not become disastrous; 3. easily recover from impacts; 4. learn from events, adapt 
to changes, and maintain their ability to cope with disturbances also in the future.” (de Bruijn et al., 2019, 
p.3). Kozine et al. (2018) is the only other article in the dataset to include the four components for 
resilience.  
Clark et al., (2018) is critical of narrow descriptions of resilience noting that definitions that 
emphasize the physical condition of infrastructure are not referencing resilience.  Rather, they argued that 
resilience should be related to the vital services provided by the physical infrastructure. It should clarify 
human development as critical infrastructure’s primary purpose is to provide essential services to society.  
Throughout the dataset, five articles refer to the importance of providing essential services when 
determining resilience (Clark et al., 2018; Comert et al., 2018; Pursiainen, 2018; Roe & Schulman, 2012; 
van der Merwe et al., 2020). Notably, Nordic countries' CI resilience policies focus on CI's vital societal 
functions instead of protecting physical infrastructure. For example, Finland’s approach to resilience of 
CI emphasizes the assurance that society and the government can function during a disruption or extreme 
event and not the protection of physical infrastructure (Pursiainen, 2018). Norway’s perspective on CI 
resilience builds on this idea even further as it clearly defines the most vital societal functions as those 





Overall, it is evident that the definition of resilience remains more closely linked to the original 
understanding from the engineering field and emphasizes the protection of and minimization of impacts 
on physical structures. As described in Chapter 2, engineering resilience does not capture the complexity 
of CI. It requires a more robust definition and should capture both pre-and post-data (instead of focusing 
on only pre-disaster data to understand exposure and sensitivity), focus on minimizing impacts (instead of 
preventing them) and seek to improve the ability of the system(s) to cope with and recover from future 
unanticipated crises or disasters (instead of attempting to predict the frequency and magnitude of events).  
2. Types of Resilience 
Critical infrastructure resilience has historically centred on the idea of protecting physical assets, but 
several studies in the dataset identified different types of resilience. There is still an over-emphasis on 
technical resilience within the dataset despite advocacy within the literature to focus on societal 
resilience. Interestingly, there has been an emergence of organizational and economic resilience, which 
reflects the transition of CI out of the public realm and indicates some acknowledgement from private 
sector actors that they must also understand and improve CI resilience.  
Technical resilience appeared the most often across the dataset, which is described as the 
improvement of the physical infrastructure’s resistance to damage and its ability to perform when faced 
with disruption (Egli et al., 2019; Fekete, 2019; Labaka et al., 2016; Pursiainen, 2018, 2018; Ridley, 
2011; Rød et al., 2020; Serre & Heinzlef, 2018; Tonn et al., 2020; van der Merwe et al., 2020). Serre & 
Heinzlef (2018) analyzed the technical resilience of systems in an urban setting by analyzing their 
abilities to absorb and recover from a disturbance. The authors posited that the resilience of an urban 
environment is highly dependent on the resilience of its technical systems and their ability to maintain 
functions following a significant disruption (Serre & Heinzlef, 2018). The dominance of technical 
resilience in current literature is due to the origin of CI research in the engineering field and the focus on  
protection of physical assets (Fekete, 2019).  Organizational resilience appeared in five articles in the 
dataset (Brown et al., 2017; Labaka et al., 2016; Pursiainen, 2018; Ridley, 2011; Rød et al., 2020; Serre & 
Heinzlef, 2018).  
Organizational resilience is an emerging field and refers specifically to an organization's capacity to 
adapt to and recover from a crisis (Brown et al., 2017; Labaka et al., 2016). Ridley (2011) presented a 





to include critical infrastructure resilience due to national and global security concerns. Private owners 
increasingly control critical infrastructure in Western countries. Although organizational resilience is an 
emerging field, it may become more relevant to explore CI research if CI ownership remains dominated 
by the private sector. If private actors are the primary owners and operators of CI, they will inherently 
hold the responsibility of ensuring its resilience because they provide vital services to society. The 
literature alludes to the conclusion that despite the transition of CI from the public sector to predominately 
within the private sector, limited research has been conducted to analyze organizational resilience of CI 
despite its importance and necessity.  
Several papers discuss economic resilience (n=3). It is closely related to organizational resilience but 
focuses specifically on economic dimensions, such as the efficient use of resources, coping with resource 
scarcity during crises and investing resources in repair and reconstruction (Dormady et al., 2019; Labaka 
et al., 2016; Murdock et al., 2018). Dormady et al. (2019) presented a framework applying economic 
resilience in a microeconomic context by applying a Constant Elasticity of Substitution Function, which 
calculates the effectiveness of various individual tactics within one CI organization but could be scoped to 
a macroeconomic focus as well. Additionally, economic resilience addresses the need to reduce the loss 
of goods and services from a disrupted infrastructure and more closely aligns with complex adaptive 
systems resilience. In contrast, engineering resilience focuses on reducing physical damage (Dormady et 
al., 2019).  
Four articles in the dataset discussed societal resilience (Clark et al., 2018; Labaka et al., 2016; 
Murdock et al., 2018; Pursiainen, 2018). Societal resilience is the use of social capital and networks to 
reduce losses and impacts from the disruption to critical infrastructure and, despite the limited research in 
CI literature, has significant potential to play a critical role in overall CI resilience (Clark et al., 2018; 
Labaka et al., 2016). Clark et al. (2018) presented research that suggests communities with high social 
capital perform better following a disaster since they can self-organize and provide help to community 
members and, consequently, have higher survival rates and faster recovery. Furthermore, Labaka et al. 
(2016) explored several non-technical solutions which coincide with societal resilience such as 
developing trusted network communities to gather and share information as well as the preparation of 
surrounding populations to ensure they are prepared for any crises that could occur. Societal resilience 
identifies responsibilities for all four stakeholders identified in Chapter 2 and the utilization of non-





CI policies in Nordic countries are typically more focused on societal resilience and less focused 
on technological and organizational resilience since they focus more on the assurance that actors such as 
governments, communities and households remain resilient during disasters in comparison to businesses 
(organizational) or the safety and security of the physical infrastructures (technological). Pursiainen 
(2018) presented a Nordic model for critical infrastructure resilience, positing that Nordic countries 
(Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden and excluding Iceland) are better equipped to address critical 
infrastructure disruptions and failures in comparison to the European Union (EU), because they prioritize 
societal resilience. Furthermore, the author argues Sweden was one of the first countries to prioritize 
societal safety and security in its national strategy for the protection of important public services, which 
defined resilience as “the capacity that society has to withstand and recover from disruption” (Pursiainen, 
2018, p.635).  
Four articles in the dataset discussed three or more types of resilience in detail (Labaka et al., 2016; 
Murdock et al., 2018; Pursiainen, 2018; Rød et al., 2020). Labaka et al. (2016) considered the importance 
of the four types of resilience (technical, organizational, economic, and social). The authors posit that 
adopting all four types can provide a more holistic and prescriptive approach to improving CI resilience. 
In conclusion, the literature indicates an over-emphasis on technical resilience even though there is a 
growing sentiment justifying a move towards societal resilience.  
3. Risks and Hazards to Critical Infrastructure 
To be effective, policies for CI resilience must consider a wide range of risks, including s non-
physical risks (cyber-attacks, regulatory changes, privatization, fiscal austerity) since they can 
significantly affect CI (Brown et al., 2017). Overall, the literature in the dataset focuses primarily on 
physical threats, specifically natural hazards, and disasters. There is little discussion around non-physical 
threats, particularly the political threats to CI resilience.  
The most discussed risks to CI across the dataset are natural hazards and disasters (n=10). Within the 
dataset, four articles  focused explicitly on evaluating or improving resilience against disasters (Croope & 
McNeil, 2011; Nazarnia et al., 2020; Wei et al., 2019.; Zimmerman et al., 2017). The second most 
discussed physical risk across the dataset was floods (n=7), and the articles focused specifically on 
understanding or building resilience of CI to flooding (de Bruijn et al., 2019; Espada et al., 2017; Fekete, 





Heinzlef (2018) stated that floods are the costliest natural disaster globally, significantly increasing year 
over year.  De Bruijn et al. (2019), Pant et al. (2018), and Fekete (2019) argued that there is a lack of 
assessment of flood impacts when understanding CI resilience due to insufficient research on the 
quantitative and qualitative costs of flooding to CI. Furthermore, cascading effects between CI demand a 
broader understanding of the damage that occurs, including hazard triggers like fires, oil spills, terror 
attacks, and others. Therefore, building CI resilience is a necessity for a community’s overall resilience. 
The third most discussed risk is earthquakes (n=4) (Brown et al., 2017; Cutts et al., 2017; Fang & 
Sansavini, 2019; Roe & Schulman, 2012). Cutts et al. (2015) conducted research using workshops to 
develop a plan that would improve the resilience of a region if an earthquake or tsunami occurred in the 
Pacific Northwest, which resulted in a framework that could be applied in any region as we all as other 
hazards. Fang & Sansavini (2019) proposed a multi-mode restoration model that addresses a gap in 
knowledge surrounding electrical power restoration following an earthquake.  
Tsunamis are the next most discussed physical hazard (n=3) (Cutts et al., 2017; Roe & Schulman, 
2012; Wei et al., 2019). Wei et al. (2019) presented two different quantitative models to estimate the 
economic consequences of a tsunami’s disruption to a port and the port’s resilience to a tsunami scenario 
in California. Only two articles in the dataset referenced terrorism as a risk to CI, which is interesting 
since the historical focus of national and regional CI policies was terrorism. These results further 
demonstrate the transition to a more holistic understanding of risks such as natural hazards and disasters 
(Bloomfield et al., 2017; Pursiainen, 2018). Additional risks to CI discussed were: climate change (n=3); 
cyber-attacks (n=3); pandemics (n=2); fires (n=1); and sea-level rise (n=1) ((Bloomfield et al., 2017; 
Clark et al., 2018; Comert et al., 2018; Fekete, 2019; McDonald et al., 2018; Pant et al., 2018; Tonn et al., 
2020; Zimmerman et al., 2017).  
There is a lack of substantive research across the dataset around climate change, sea-level rise, and 
fires. There is also little discussion in the dataset about an all-hazard approach to assessing risk to CI, 
which would capture the risk of a full breadth of threats, such as floods, severe weather, wildfires, 
earthquakes, pandemics, and industrial accidents (OECD, 2019; Pursiainen, 2009). Three papers 
specifically outlined the use of an all-hazard approach through the integration of human-caused and 
natural hazards, instead of focusing on improving the resilience of CI against one type of risk. Many 
Nordic and EU countries have adopted the all-hazard approach (Fekete, 2019; Pursiainen, 2018; Rogers, 





occur “on average once or more every 100 years (i.e. annual probability of one percent or more) for which 
the consequences represent significant potential impacts, i.e. number of affected people greater than 50, 
economic and environmental costs above €100 million, and political and social impact considered 
significant or very serious” (Pursiainen, 2018, p.636).  
Finally, commonly neglected risks across CI management plans are the non-physical risks such as 
cyber-attacks and political threats such as privatization of CI industries and deregulation  (Brown et al., 
2017; Cedergren et al., 2018; Fekete, 2019). Brown et al. (2017) surveyed several CI organizations across 
New Zealand to identify what they believed were their most significant risks. The results found that two 
of the top five risks identified were non-physical such as “reputation damage and regulatory change” 
(Brown et al., 2017, p.46). An article in the dataset examining a Swedish railway system identified that 
many problems associated with the response and recovery of the infrastructure are the result of the 
deregulation of the railway, underfunding, prioritization of efficiency and the responsibility of operation 
and maintenance responsibility split between public and private actors (Cedergren et al., 2018). In 
conclusion, the literature largely emphasizes physical threats revealing a potential research gap analyzing 
the impacts of non-physical threats such as cyber-attacks and political threats.  
4. Types of Infrastructure 
Globally, the dominant infrastructure sectors are energy, water, transport, information and technology 
communications (ICT), health, food supply, banking and finance, government services, safety and 
emergency services (OECD, 2019). The systematic review indicated that the research largely focuses on 
three infrastructure sectors, including electric power, transportation, and water. The following 
infrastructure types were the most mentioned within the dataset as critical infrastructure: power and 
energy (n=32); transport (n=30); water (n=29); ICT (n=18). This finding makes sense as power, transport 
and water are vital for the functioning of society, and in particular, power and energy are necessary to 
enable the functioning of most other CI sectors. Interestingly, there is minimal research and discussion 
around the healthcare and emergency services sectors despite their necessity for the functioning of society 
and particularly their vital role in crises and disasters, leaving a significant research gap around those 
sectors and their resilience. 
Eleven articles in the dataset to focus on power systems in their research, to illustrate frameworks or 





Sansavini, 2019; Krishnamurthy et al., 2020; Murdock et al., 2018; Nazarnia et al., 2020; Ouyang et al., 
2019; Rachunok & Nateghi, 2020; Roe & Schulman, 2012; van der Merwe et al., 2020; Zimmerman et 
al., 2017). These articles seek to model and assess the resilience of power systems, particularly through 
case studies in specific regions, or to assess the interdependencies of two or three CI sectors, including 
power systems, to understand the overall system's vulnerabilities. The predominance of power systems is 
likely due to the interconnectedness of power systems. The disruption of power systems can have severe 
cascading effects, such as the power outage in North America in 2003, which disrupted communication 
systems, public transit and water distribution (Applegate & Tien, 2019). Furthermore, Dick et al. (2019) 
argued that resilience of electricity-related infrastructure is important to ensure public safety and reduce 
supply disruption, asserting that replacing and repairing ageing infrastructure is imperative due to its 
importance. Additionally, Krishnamurthy et al. (2020) applied a model to evaluate the resilience of a 
Texas electric power grid since cascading effects of power outages can cause widespread blackouts.  
Articles in the dataset that focused on transportation infrastructure were highly technical and typically 
involved modelling the impacts of a particular threat. Several proposed technical models and frameworks 
seek to assess threats, identify interdependencies, and assist in decision-making during a crisis to ensure 
the operation and functioning of transportation infrastructure. For example, Comert et al. (2018) sought to 
reduce the vulnerability of intelligent traffic signals to cybersecurity attacks as the authors state that 
resilient transport networks are critical for resilient cities. Tonn et al. (2020) studied infrastructure 
resilience metrics. They applied them to a real-life transportation system: Amtrack, a passenger rail 
service in the United States which can then improve other transportation infrastructure systems. 
Additionally, transportation infrastructure is also studied alongside power infrastructure as they both play 
important roles in recovery and resilience during a disaster (Murdock et al., 2018). 
Although water was one of the top three researched infrastructures within the dataset, there appears to 
be sparse research relative to power and transport since there were only five articles in the dataset that 
researched water infrastructure (Applegate & Tien, 2019; Johansen & Tien, 2018; Nazarnia et al., 2020; 
Pant et al., 2018; Zimmerman et al., 2017). Water infrastructure was also only studied alongside other 
types of infrastructure such as power and transportation and not studied within the dataset alone. The 
research focuses on modelling interdependencies between water and other infrastructure. For example, 
several developed highly technical frameworks to understand the vulnerability of a system of 
infrastructures, including water, to assess the system's resilience. For instance, Nazarnia et al. (2020) 





interdependencies between water and power infrastructure disruption following an earthquake. 
Zimmerman et al. (2017) presented a framework that assesses recovery and interdependencies between 
infrastructure following an extreme weather event, focusing on three types of infrastructure: electric 
power, transportation, and water. Bloomfield et al. (2017) presented a tool to analyze interdependencies 
between infrastructures using the case study of the power and communication networks in Rome, Italy. 
Furthermore, de Bruijn et al. (2019) highlighted the importance of analyzing the cascading impacts of 
disruptions to transport and communication networks following extreme weather events due to their 
connection to emergency management and recovery. Most research focuses on a specific type of 
infrastructure instead of analyzing the cascading effects. 
  Several other CI sectors had limited discussion and study across the dataset, such as food 
production and distribution systems (n=12); healthcare (n=7), emergency services and first responders 
(n=3); and manufacturing (n=3). Although there were twelve articles in the dataset to include food 
production and distribution, no article focused on examining the food system's resilience. Mcdonald et al. 
(2018) is the only article across the dataset to examine the impacts of a significant disruption (worldwide 
pandemic) on the healthcare system and the associated economic losses and cascading impacts to other CI 
sectors such as emergency services. In conclusion, there is limited analysis of CI sectors outside of power, 
transportation, and water. In particular, significant sectors such as healthcare and emergency services 
receive less attention despite their vital role in crises and disasters, creating a research gap around those 






Themes among Research Objectives and Findings 
The codebook provided in the previous sections was analyzed to identify major themes among research 
objectives and findings. This section provides an overview of the major themes within the articles in the 
dataset which includes: 
1) Enhancing resilience (n=27); 
2) Assessing resilience (n=22); 
3) Case studies (n=22);  
4) Frameworks (n=20); and, 
5) Research gaps (n=15) 
 
1. Enhancing Resilience 
Of the 39 articles in the dataset, 27 papers present or explore frameworks, tools and technologies to 
enhance the resilience of critical infrastructure. The emphasis is on utilizing technology and quantitative 
models and frameworks to enhance resilience. There is little discussion around public policy tools such as 
market incentives or legislation and policies as a mechanism to enhance resilience.  
There were eleven articles in the dataset that discussed specific technological innovations that seek to 
enhance resilience (Croope & McNeil, 2011; Curt & Tacnet, 2018; Dick et al., 2019; Dormady et al., 
2019; Espada et al., 2017; Fang & Sansavini, 2019; Johansen & Tien, 2018; Murdock et al., 2018; Rød et 
al., 2020; Serre & Heinzlef, 2018; Wei et al., 2019). Previous reviews of tools and techniques to enhance 
the resilience of CI have found limited application and operation of these tools (Curt & Tacnet, 2018; Rød 
et al., 2020).  For example, Curt & Tacnet (2018) found that technological models such as Bayesian 
networks, multicriteria aggregation and knowledge-based systems can be used to improve resilience. The 
authors found that they can overcome barriers such as a lack of operational metrics and the complex 
decision-making involved in disruption events. Furthermore, Rod et al. (2020) presented a standardized 
CI resilience management framework for CI operators and techniques for CI resilience assessment. 
Although the authors focus on resilience assessment techniques, they briefly conclude that it is impossible 
to operationalize CI resilience enhancement without measurable CI resilience assessment and quantifiable 





geographic information systems (GIS), stochastic programming, probabilistic multi-scale modelling, 
multi-regional computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, deep learning and machine vision as 
probable tools for enhancing CI resilience (Croope & McNeil, 2011; Dick et al., 2019; Fang & Sansavini, 
2019; Johansen & Tien, 2018; Wei et al., 2019). The technological solutions targeted for enhancing CI 
resilience are structural actions specifically related to the physical structures or systems. However, 
nonstructural actions (i.e. using knowledge, practice or agreement to enhance resilience) can provide a 
robust, holistic approach to enhancing societal resilience (Curt & Tacnet, 2018).  
Across the literature, there is an assumption that private sector stakeholders are primarily responsible 
for improving CI resilience since most CI is owned and operated privately (Boin & McConnell, 2007; 
Cutts et al., 2017; Egli et al., 2019; Ridley, 2011).  For example, Labaka et al. (2016), Espada et al. 
(2017), and Ouyang et al. (2019) all presented technological models and tools to assist in improving the 
resilience of CI. The solutions indicate that resilience falls onto CI operators and managers but fails to 
discuss the necessary incentives the CI stakeholders need to invest in preventative risk management (Boin 
& McConnell, 2007). Similarly, Ridley et al. (2011) proposed that CI resilience is now a CSR 
phenomenon due to the widespread privatization of CI sectors globally. Van der Merwe et al. (2020) also 
presented novel findings that suggest a sense of coherence (i.e. how a person would perceive, cope and 
recover from a risk) among employees working in a CI organization may improve resilience following an 
extreme event. The researchers concluded that due to CI’s impact on national and global security, 
additional study and contributions from CSR researchers are useful in understanding how resilience can 
be incorporated.  
There is limited support in the dataset for the responsibility of risk to be shifted onto governments and 
policymakers. Some frameworks and research are providing detailed direction for the burden of 
responsibility for each stakeholder, which mainly includes adequate training and preparation for CI 
operators, different levels of government, emergency responders, as well citizens, media and businesses 
as the means that would enhance the resilience of CI (Boin & McConnell, 2007). For example, Egli et al., 
(2019) emphasized the importance of collaboration with the local government since most disaster and 
emergency response occurs at the community level. However, most public-private partnerships occur at 
the federal and state level. Similarly, de Bruijn et al. (2019) emphasized the importance of stakeholder 
collaboration between local government, emergency responders and CI operators. Labaka et al., (2016) 





principles such as government preparation, public crisis response budget, societal situational awareness 
and first responder preparation.  
Some literature indicates that legislation or market forces should not drive CI resilience, rather 
partnerships between the private and public sectors are the solution (Boin & McConnell, 2007; Egli et al., 
2019).   There is, however, minimal discussion around the incentives and motivations that would drive 
implementation of these solutions. Furthermore, there is no discussion around the facilitation of 
collaboration between stakeholders through tools such as market mechanisms or legislation. Furthermore, 
there is hardly any discussion around collaboration with local government despite their significant role in 
protecting CI (Egli et al., 2019).  
There is also limited research across the dataset addressing the need for robust public policy tools to 
enhance resilience. However, briefly mentioned in the dataset include incentives for private sector CI 
(Boin & McConnell, 2007), public sector investment into CI sectors and robust government leadership 
through legislation of resilience and enforcement (Cutts et al., 2017). Brown et al. (2017) provided a case 
study of the effectiveness of CI resilience in New Zealand, where the government has implemented robust 
legislation requiring resilience across CI operators and demonstrated the strength of the country’s policy 
efforts. Labaka et al. (2016) is the only article in the dataset to explicitly state that governments should 
establish regulations that state “minimum requirements that CIs need to ensure their safety and high 
reliability” (p.29). Although the literature indicates that a missing component in resilient CI is the lack of 
robust regulation, there is limited analysis around effective regulation and recommendation for robust 
regulation across the dataset (Cedergren et al., 2018; Fekete, 2019; Garschagen & Sandholz, 2018; 
Pursiainen, 2018). The lack of discussion around regulation is a barrier to CI resilience because many CI 
sectors are privately owned and operated in North America and Europe. Both regions focus more on 
public-private partnerships (PPPs) than direct regulation.  
The literature indicated that there is hesitancy for further regulation implementing CI resilience 
measures. The reasons suggested include concerns that further regulation would require the 
internalization of costs from CI disruptions, necessitate tort liability legislation and potentially precede 
demands from consumers for compensation of losses following disruptions to CI services (Pursiainen, 
2018). There was no other article within the dataset to discuss public policy tools surrounding CI 
resilience. Based on these findings, there is evidence of a research gap across the literature in the dataset 





2. Assessing Resilience 
The assessment of CI resilience is still an emerging area, typically focusing on the technical attributes 
of CI, and although there are several models, they are primarily theoretical with limited operative use and 
empirical examples (Brown et al., 2017; Pursiainen, 2018; Rød et al., 2020; Tonn et al., 2020). There 
were 22 articles in the dataset that included or focused on exploring the assessment of CI resilience. The 
articles in the dataset either focused on establishing or examining a quantitative or qualitative framework 
for CI resilience with limited combination between the two approaches.  
Quantitative frameworks examined indicators surrounding the physical structure or performance of 
CI. For example, Croope & McNeil (2011) presents a framework known as the Critical Infrastructure 
Resilience Decision Support System (CIR-DSS), which uses indicators such as physical damage and pre-
and post-event response and recovery to assess resilience. Serre & Heinzlef (2018) assessed CI resilience 
using three capacities: resistance capacity (analyzing the physical damages), absorption capacity 
(alternatives that can be used when a failure occurs) and recovery ability (the time required to restored 
damaged components).  
Several articles identified the indicator of  “service disruption” and its variations. There is a pattern in 
the literature indicating that this approach is becoming the predominant quantitative measurement of CI 
resilience as it may overcome the challenge that exists with the use of physical damages as an indicator to 
measure resilience. For example, Murdock et al. (2018) assessed CI resilience using the indicators 
“Expected Annual Damage” and “Expected Annual Disruption,” and similarly, (de Bruijn et al., 2019) 
uses the indicator “person disruption days.” Nazarnia et al., (2020) presented a novel framework using 
similar CI service disruption data (the number of households which experience service disruption and the 
duration of service disruption) to quantify CI resilience effectively. Zimmerman et al., (2017) utilized the 
indicator of duration of service outages, as well as recovery rates and costs of associated disruptions. 
Several frameworks focus on service disruption and recovery time as indicators indicating substantial 
overlap and redundancy across the articles in the dataset. The research also indicates limited real-life use 
of the frameworks and indicators presented by CI owners and operators (Kozine et al., 2018). 
Additionally, several frameworks utilize qualitative indicators to examine and assess CI resilience, 
but there is little consistency between the research around the best qualitative indicator for resilience. The 





qualitative assessment of CI resilience is very complex and likely to be context-dependent. For example, 
two studies assessed resilience in one or more organizations and consulted with employees to build out a 
list of indicators specific to their organization. Examples of indicators are provided in Table 12 (Brown et 
al., 2017; Tonn et al., 2020). The two lists contain the most extensive number of indicators within any 
other article within the dataset. These indicators did not appear in any other article in the dataset as they 
were created for specific organizations. This alludes to the potential conclusion that CI resilience 
indicators might need to be tailored to specific industries or even specific organizations and therefore 
could be limited for generalization across sectors. van der Merwe et al., (2020) successfully utilized a 
novel indicator for assessing CI resilience – sense of coherence (SOC) – and found that in a CI 
organization, when there was a higher SOC among employees, there was a positive correlation with 
resilient outcomes following a disruption. Similarly, Robert et al. (2015) presented a framework for 
assessing the resilience of CI using coherence analysis including three pillars: acceptance, planning and 
anticipation and their associated criteria, which allows for CI organizations to identify gaps and prioritize 
the actions which would improve CI resilience. Across the dataset, there was only one framework that 
combined quantitative and qualitative indicators for a more advanced, holistic understanding and 
assessment of CI resilience (Croope & McNeil, 2011).   
Although the research includes some empirical application of qualitative CI resilience assessment in 
various organizations, there is no academic or real-life consensus surrounding the most effective method 
for assessing CI resilience which hinders its practical application and execution. There remains a need for 
further research which explores the limitations of a standardized CIR management process in the industry 
and an analysis of the industry’s current state in terms of its perspective and practice of CI resilience 
assessment.  
Table 12: Example indicators for organizational resilience (Brown et al., 2017; Tonn et al., 2020) 
Staff engagement 
Effective partnerships 
Stress testing plans 
Collecting weather data 
Communication systems – staff 
Training drills 
Insurance coverage 
Operational funding for resilience initiatives 






3. Case Studies 
Out of the 39 articles in the dataset, 22 focused on or included a case study. This section describes the 
three following parameters of the case studies: geographic location, hazard, and CI sector.  
Geographically, the case studies focused almost exclusively on the Global North and, in particular, 
North America. Outside of the Global North, only one developing country indicated a lack of geographic 
variability within the case studies in this data. Eleven case study locations were in North America 
(Croope & McNeil, 2011; de Bruijn et al., 2019; Dick et al., 2019; Krishnamurthy et al., 2020; Murdock 
et al., 2018; Rachunok & Nateghi, 2020; Ridley, 2011; Robert et al., 2015; Roe & Schulman, 2012; Tonn 
et al., 2020; Zimmerman et al., 2017). Of those eleven articles, nine are in the United States. The 
remaining three case studies are in Canada (Murdock et al., 2018; Robert et al., 2015; Zimmerman et al., 
2017). The remaining study locations include Australia (Espada et al., 2017), Britain (Ridley, 2011), 
Germany (Serre & Heinzlef, 2018), Italy (Kozine et al., 2018),  Nepal (Nazarnia et al., 2020), New 
Zealand (Brown et al., 2017),  Portugal (Rød et al., 2020), South Africa (van der Merwe et al., 2020) and 
Sweden (Cedergren et al., 2018). Two articles out of the 22 did not have a stated study location and there 
was no indication of any regional or national application (Dormady et al., 2019; Labaka et al., 2016). 
More specifically, Dormady et al., (2019) presented four mathematical case studies to apply their 
production theory and demonstrate a resilience cost-benefit analysis and Labaka et al., (2016) 
demonstratec their resilience framework in two case studies using the examples of a nuclear power plant 
and water distribution company. 
In addition to geographic diversity, case studies also varied in terms of the hazard they analyzed. 
Many case studies did not focus on one specific hazard. Instead, they demonstrated the resilience of a 
system to various hazards, which aligns with the literature's recommendation to focus on an all-hazard 
approach. Within the case studies that did focus on a specific hazard, they were almost exclusively 
physical hazards, and in particular, they focused on flooding, earthquakes and hurricanes. Overall, the 
case studies did not focus on non-physical hazards, indicating a significant research gap around an 
empirical analysis of non-physical threats to CI resilience. The most commonly studied hazard in case 
studies across the dataset was flooding, included in five articles out of 22 (Croope & McNeil, 2011; de 
Bruijn et al., 2019; Murdock et al., 2018; Pant et al., 2018; Serre & Heinzlef, 2018). Other hazards studied 
in the case studies include earthquakes and hurricanes (Dormady et al., 2019; Rachunok & Nateghi, 





articles out of the 22 in the dataset did not state a specific hazard in their case studies and typically stated 
that the case study was analyzing any disruptive event that would occur to the CI or did not state anything 
related to a hazard (Brown et al., 2017; Cedergren et al., 2018; Fang & Sansavini, 2019; Kozine et al., 
2018; Labaka et al., 2016; Nazarnia et al., 2020; Ridley, 2011; Rød et al., 2020; Tonn et al., 2020; van der 
Merwe et al., 2020; Zimmerman et al., 2017).  
Finally, the case studies varied in terms of the CI sector, which they analyzed. In alignment with the 
previous section, the most researched CI sector within the case studies was power, transportation and 
water. Similar to the previous section, the results indicate much less focus on CI sectors outside of these 
three, presenting a significant research gap. The most observed CI sector in the case studies across the 
dataset was the power sector; power was studied in nine case studies (Brown et al., 2017; Dick et al., 
2019; Fang & Sansavini, 2019; Krishnamurthy et al., 2020; Nazarnia et al., 2020; Rachunok & Nateghi, 
2020; Roe & Schulman, 2012; van der Merwe et al., 2020; Zimmerman et al., 2017). Second, eight of the 
22 articles focused on transportation (Brown et al., 2017; Cedergren et al., 2018; Croope & McNeil, 2011; 
Murdock et al., 2018; Ridley, 2011; Serre & Heinzlef, 2018; Tonn et al., 2020; Zimmerman et al., 2017).  
The other infrastructure studied in the case studies across the dataset are water (n=6) (Brown et al., 
2017; Johansen & Tien, 2018; Labaka et al., 2016; Nazarnia et al., 2020; Rød et al., 2020; Zimmerman et 
al., 2017), telecommunications (n=2) (Brown et al., 2017; Ridley, 2011), and nuclear power (n=1) 
(Labaka et al., 2016). Four articles in the dataset did not specify any specific CI sectors in their case study 
(de Bruijn et al., 2019; Espada et al., 2017; Pant et al., 2018; Robert et al., 2015). Furthermore, two case 
studies did not focus on any CI sector. Instead, they conducted case studies around the economic 
resilience of a private organization (Dormady et al., 2019) and how public-private partnerships contribute 
to CI resilience (Kozine et al., 2018). Most case studies applied a framework developed to demonstrate 
the assessment or enhancement of the resilience of a particular infrastructure sector(s) to either a specific 
hazard or various disruptive events.  
In summary, the case studies conducted within this dataset focused almost entirely on the Global 
North and specifically in North America, with only one reference of a case study outside of the Global 
North (Nepal). The case studies also focused on assessing or enhancing resilience to physical hazards, 
particularly flooding, with no reference to non-physical hazards. Finally, the case studies primarily 
focused on analyzing the resilience of power, transportation and water sectors with little attention to 






Twenty articles in the dataset presented or developed novel frameworks in their research. A 
framework, in this context, refers to a network of interlinked concepts where each play an integral role to 
provide an understanding of a phenomena (Jabareen, 2009). The frameworks varied based on whether 
they were quantitative or qualitative, whether they were empirical or theoretical, and the intended users of 
the framework.  
The articles in the dataset that presented frameworks were predominately quantitative, which aligns 
with previous findings reported in this chapter that CI resilience research remains highly technical. 
Furthermore, the case studies were predominately empirical, and within the research, they would present 
a framework and then demonstrate the application of the framework through a case study. Finally, the 
stated intended users of the framework were primarily for government leaders and policymakers, which 
conflict with the dominance of highly technical and quantitative frameworks. It was unclear how 
policymakers would interpret and apply technical frameworks. Additionally, there was little information 
regarding how the authors of these frameworks intended this information to be disseminated to their 
intended users. 
Out of the 20 articles, 13 presented quantitative frameworks (Applegate & Tien, 2019; Dormady et 
al., 2019; Espada et al., 2017; Fang & Sansavini, 2019; Johansen & Tien, 2018; Krishnamurthy et al., 
2020; McDonald et al., 2018; Nazarnia et al., 2020; Pant et al., 2018; Rachunok & Nateghi, 2020; Tonn et 
al., 2020; Wei et al., 2020; Zimmerman et al., 2017). Six articles presented qualitative frameworks (Clark 
et al., 2018; Egli et al., 2019; Fekete, 2019; Kozine et al., 2018; Labaka et al., 2016; Rød et al., 2020). 
Only one framework combined qualitative and quantitative metrics and the research objective was to 
build a decision-support system to assess and improve CI resilience following a disaster (Croope & 
McNeil, 2011).  
The frameworks were predominantly empirical (n=13), presented by the authors and then 
demonstrated through an applied case study (Applegate & Tien, 2019; Espada et al., 2017; Fang & 
Sansavini, 2019; Johansen & Tien, 2018; Kozine et al., 2018; Krishnamurthy et al., 2020; Labaka et al., 
2016; Nazarnia et al., 2020; Pant et al., 2018; Rachunok & Nateghi, 2020; Tonn et al., 2020; Wei et al., 





did not include any empirical application (Clark et al., 2018; Dormady et al., 2019; Egli et al., 2019; 
Fekete, 2019; McDonald et al., 2018; Pant et al., 2018; Rød et al., 2020).  
Another essential factor concerning the frameworks presented across the dataset is the stated intended 
users of the framework. Eight articles in the dataset outlined the users of their frameworks as government 
leaders and policymakers (Clark et al., 2018; Croope & McNeil, 2011; Egli et al., 2019; Espada et al., 
2017; McDonald et al., 2018; Nazarnia et al., 2020; Pant et al., 2018; Wei et al., 2020). Five articles that 
presented frameworks outlined the users as CI owners and operators (Dormady et al., 2019; Fang & 
Sansavini, 2019; Labaka et al., 2016; Rød et al., 2020; Tonn et al., 2020). Five articles did not state who 
the users of their framework would be (Fekete, 2019; Johansen & Tien, 2018; Kozine et al., 2018; 
Krishnamurthy et al., 2020; Rachunok & Nateghi, 2020). Finally, one article stated that there were 
multiple users of their framework, which included “decision-makers, planners and [CI] operators” 
(Zimmerman et al., 2017, p.1).  
Based on these findings, there is more of a focus on quantitative frameworks than qualitative 
frameworks, and indeed, limited frameworks combine quantitative and qualitative metrics. Furthermore, 
there is preliminary research for frameworks that many actors can use but only one framework stated their 
intended users were multiple stakeholders. Finally, there was little discussion surrounding the 
dissemination of frameworks for real-life usage by any stakeholders or how technical frameworks could 
adapt for usage by government leaders and policymakers.  
5. Research Gaps 
Many research gaps were presented in the articles across the dataset, but they were predominately 
more quantitative research gaps than qualitative. Most research gaps listed in the articles across the 
dataset are related to further advancing knowledge around the assessment of vulnerabilities, risks, CI 
resilience and the application of frameworks. For example, Garschagen & Sandholz (2018) highlighted 
the significant research gaps in the literature surrounding the assessment of social vulnerability and the 
connection to CI failures. Most research on vulnerability assessments refers to the direct impacts of an 
environmental disaster on households or individuals. However, there is little research around 
understanding how CI disruption or failure would have various societal impacts, such as the secondary 





Furthermore, Pant et al., (2018) stated that a significant research gap in the literature is the lack of 
research conducted to quantify the flood risk on CI, particularly since flooding is the most significant risk 
in many areas of the world and will increase in intensity and frequency under every climate change 
scenario (UNEP, 2020). In addition, there is also a significant research gap for other non-physical hazards 
such as cyber-attacks and political threats. Furthermore, there remains a significant research gap that can 
also utilize household disruption service data and patterns and the status of end-users of CI services to 
characterize infrastructure resilience in other regions (Nazarnia et al., 2020). Similarly, there is 
insufficient research that quantifies and represents infrastructure network interdependencies which is 
critical for understanding the cascading effects of CI failure (Pant et al., 2018).  
The qualitative research gaps include the further exploration of policies that reduce CI resilience, the 
overlap of CI resilience with other fields of research such as disaster risk management and corporate 
social responsibility, and the exploration of the application of frameworks for the assessment of CI 
resilience. For example, Cedergren et al., (2018) briefly explored the connection between deregulation 
and underfunding on the Swedish railway system and suggests the further exploration of the role 
privatization and deregulation have played on impacting the resilience of CI and their recovery 
capabilities. Authors in the dataset have presented essential research gaps related to CI literature's lack of 
connection and overlap with other fields, particularly disaster risk management and corporate social 
responsibility. Fekete (2019) stated that the bridges between disaster risk management and CI literature 
are incredibly understudied despite the vital connection, mainly as flood risk is one of the most significant 
global risks. The subsequent damage to infrastructure presents paramount costly and lethal risks. 
Furthermore, Ridley (2011) pointed out that since CI resilience is studied primarily in technical 
contexts (i.e. engineering), it limits the knowledge and tools that can be utilized and adapted from other 
fields to assist in problem-solving. Similarly, Clark et al., (2018) suggested that leveraging business 
knowledge around resilient supply chains can facilitate and strengthen CI resilience since many 
companies have developed resilience strategies and plan to ensure they can provide their products and 
services. Several authors in the dataset state that there are several frameworks in the literature, but there is 
limited standardization in the field of CI resilience assessment, and the application of frameworks in CI 
organizations has not been adequatly explored (Kozine et al., 2018; Labaka et al., 2016; van der Merwe et 
al., 2020). Finally, adequate research has not been conducted to sufficiently explore the connection 
between CI resilience and infrastructure interdependencies despite their essential and intricate connection 





Chapter 5: Discussion 
The objective of this study was to contribute to the existing knowledge of critical infrastructure resilience 
by systematically reviewing scholarly literature, analyzing major and minor themes and identifying future 
research direction. This chapter answers the research questions stated in Chapter 1, draws connections 
between Chapters 2 and 4 and provides future research directions for critical infrastructure resilience.  
Lack of Overlap with Other Research Fields 
Aside from natural hazards and flooding, there remains limited research of CI in various research 
fields outside of engineering. Engineering continues to be the dominant field for most CI resilience 
research. Although there is some crossover in the social sciences field, the limited research in other fields 
impedes the development of knowledge and tools that can be utilized and adapted from other fields to 
assist in problem-solving. CI resilience research in the engineering field means that the problems and 
solutions are framed in a technical context and are likely why many solutions for enhancing resilience are 
technological innovations. CI resilience research is emerging in the fields of business and economics as 
well as disaster management. It remains understudied, which means that the extant perspectives, 
knowledge and tools of CI resilience are in the engineering field and need to be diversified through the 
perspectives and knowledge of other research fields and has limited the application of the concept in real-
life. As noted in Ridley (2011), there is a need for more CI resilience research in the business and 
economics to ensure that private sector actors who own and operate critical infrastructure understand the 
necessity for resilience as how to operationalize the concept.  
In addition, the fields of ecology, natural hazards and disaster management have been studying 
resilience to physical threats for several decades and have much knowledge to offer to develop the 









A Robust Definition of CI Resilience 
Chapter 2 introduced the various definitions of resilience and the evolution of the term 
academically from its conception. Resilience when applied to CI largely reflected concepts and 
definitions developed within the fields of engineering and physics. However, as the literature has 
concluded, there are several limitations with this understanding of resilience as it is a narrow definitin 
more closely related to physical infrastructure and is not always ideal for societies to return to a pre-
disturbance state after a stress or disaster has occurred, because that pre-disturbance state which was 
impacted has indicated some degree of vulnerability. In the context of societal resilience, many times it is 
more effective to change to a new state which can be more resilient to future disasters. Some literature 
indicates a more advanced understanding of CI resilience drawing from ecology, psychology, disaster 
management and complex adaptive systems. In particular, the conceptualization of resilience is the ability 
to learn from stresses and disturbances to better prepare for unforeseen events in the future (Martin-Breen 
& Anderies, 2011). Unfortunately. as Chapter 4 indicates, the widespread use of the definition of CI 
resilience without an established definition has made it difficult to operationalize. There was little 
consistency between the definitions among the articles in the dataset, which substantiates the claim that 
there is no established term. Two conclusions arose from the results regarding a more robust definition of 
CI resilience. The first is that CI resilience incorporates four components:  
1. Planning and preparation: a resilient system cannot always prevent a hazard or disruption from 
occurring but plans and prepares for such events to occur; 
2. Reduction of impacts: a resilient system should focus on reducing the impacts of a hazard or 
disruption so that it does not become disastrous;  
3. Minimal recovery times: a resilient system is capable of reducing the disruption to physical 
infrastructure services to minimal recovery times and;  
4. Learning and evolution: a resilient system learns from previous hazards and disruptions and 
evolves to better cope with disturbances in the future. 
Second, CI resilience should explicitly focus on the vital services the infrastructure provides and 
the physical infrastructure, since their primary purpose is to deliver a vital service to society. The 
increased focus on the services infrastructure provides is an evolution from the historic narrow definition 
which is more closely related to the physical infrastructures’ resilience. Furthermore, a focus on the 





restoring vital services to society which are required to prevent significant adverse impacts to the well-
being of citizens and adverse effects to the economy.  
Risks to CI 
Chapter 2 identified several threats to CI, both physical and non-physical, including terrorism, 
natural hazards and climate change, ageing infrastructure, cyber-attacks and political threats. The results 
indicate an over-emphasis on the analysis of physical threats to CI and the absence of discussion 
surrounding the non-physical threats, such as regulatory change, deregulation and privatization of 
industries, underfunding and prioritization of efficiency to CI. The results indicate not only a lack of 
research and analysis on the risk non-physical threats pose to CI but also a lack of acknowledgement that 
non-physical threats exist and that they do influence the resilience of CI. The consequence of this is not 
having a comprehensive understanding of the actual vulnerability of CI. Without a good understanding of 
the risks to CI, it is much more challenging to improve the resilience of CI effectively. Given the large 
global landscape of threats to CI, many have the potential to not only cause a disruption to society but can 
lead to a nationwide breakdown of CI networks which could render the country’s economy and society 
non-functional. For example, the earthquake in Japan which caused a subsequent tsunami and caused the 
loss of functioning of a nuclear power plant which led to large-scale radioactive contamination in the 
country (Osei-Kyei et al., 2021). Given this conclusion, the results from this researh indicate a lack of 
understanding of the full landscape of threats to CI including a prevailing threat of cyber-attacks in the 
current digital age. 
As indicated in Chapter 4, only three papers noted cyber-threats as a risk to CI despite the 
increasing dependence of CI sectors on digital control systems and networking resources and the more 
frequent real-life scenarios where cyber-attacks threaten national security such as the increasing rate of 
cyber-attacks on government agencies, telecommunication, cloud-based document storage systems and 
even emergency responder services (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2021). Without a robust 
understanding of how cyber-attacks pose a threat to CI resilience, many countries’ national security and 
safety is at risk since cyber-attacks can not only compromise data and information, which poses a more 
major security threat but can also severely disrupt critical services and create cascading impacts that have 
a far-reaching effect globally. One such example was seen in 2017 when Wannacry ransomware spread 
and infected more than 200,000 computers in 150 countries. It impacted many commercial and 





and the National Health Service in the United Kingdom (OECD, 2019).  Therefore, a substantial research 
gap persists on the non-physical threats pose to CI and their resilience.  
Furthermore, a lack of understanding of how political landscapes can influence CI resilience will 
further hinder the developments required to improve resilience. As discussed in Chapter 2, widespread 
privatization and market liberalization globally have led to institutional fragmentation between CI sectors. 
Fiscal austerity has left many CI sectors unequipped to prioritize resilience financially. Still there were 
only two research papers in the dataset which mentioned how these factors could influence resilience. 
Exclusively privately-owned CI sectors operating under the guise of free-market principles cannot protect 
vital services. Publicly-owned CI sectors operating under fiscal austerity are also not equipped to the 
protection of vital services. Without a deeper understanding of how these threats pose a risk to CI, 
resilience is not possible (de Bruijne & van Eeten, 2007).   
CI Resilience and Natural Hazards 
Although there is some indication that flooding is the primary focus among the research in this 
dataset in terms of the interaction between CI resilience and natural hazards, overall, there is limited 
research on the impact of natural hazards on critical infrastructure resilience. The results indicated that 
there were only three papers papers published in natural hazards’ focused journals and six articles which 
focused specifcially on flooding. The articles in the dataset that focus on flooding are high-level 
methodologies and frameworks to assess CI resilience to flood or a flood resilience assessment of a 
particular community. Although there appears to be some understanding in how vulnerability and 
resilience of CI to flooding can be measured, it is apparent it is not thoroughly researched in the literature. 
There has been minimal application of these methods to understand how vulnerable or resilient CI 
globally is to flooding. Furthermore, only one article acknowledged the necessity to integrate the concepts 
of CI resilience and natural hazards, which all concludes that the connection between the two topics is 
understudied.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, natural disasters and extreme weather, specifically flooding, pose a 
significant threat to CI globally. A limited understanding academically of the degree to which these risks 
pose a threat and how to enhance resilience to natural disasters, global communities remain highly 





weather, research must focus on examining the connection between CI resilience and natural hazards to 
improve the overall resilience of society. 
Emphasis on Technical Solutions  
Across the literature, there is still an emphasis on developing and implementing technological 
solutions to enhance the resilience of CI. The emphasis on technology to improve resilience focuses 
almost exclusively on the physical structures and systems. It is not capable of addressing the non-
structural actions that are also necessary to improve CI resilience effectively. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
the origins of CI protection emerged in the engineering field, where solutions were discussed exclusively 
in technological contexts, and technological solutions typically focus on anticipating risk and protecting 
the physical structures. Although many scholars have long criticized the over-emphasis on technological 
solutions, the results indicate the literature has not evolved much over the years. Although the literature 
indicates that technical solutions (examples include retrofitting buildings to withstand natural disasters ro 
vaccines to prevent viral disease spread) can prevent harm in society, the overemphasis has dominated 
political agendas and shifted resources away from non-technical solutions (examples include regulatory 
changes or social networks). Both technical and non-technical solutions are required and can work in 
parallel to ensure a holistic approach to resilience (OECD, 2019).  
There is limited research within the dataset that explores non-technical solutions. Examples 
include the development and implementation of stricter regulation and, along with that, more consultation 
within local communities between local government, households and businesses to create contingency 
planning and business continuity planning to facilitate “organic” community responses to disruptions or 
disasters (Boin & McConnell, 2007; Pursiainen, 2018).  
Responsibility for Private Sector to Improve Resilience 
Chapter 2 puts forward that the critical principle for effective CI resilience is robust public-
private partnerships and collaboration. Since many CIs are privately owned and managed, communication 
protocols and information-sharing platforms that connect private organizations and public institutions are 
vital to enhancing CI resilience. As many of the solutions proposed to enhance resilience are 
technological in nature, there is limited research surrounding how to mobilize the private sector to 





incentives or regulatory requirements. A significant component for improving the resilience of CI is more 
robust regulation (Pursiainen, 2018). However, CI resilience research does not adequately analyze current 
public policy tools intended to improve resilience. It does not recommend any substantial regulatory 
changes to ensure safety and reliability of CI systems or services.  
The literature indicates that the exploration of regulatory solutions for CI resilience has not 
occurred primarily due to the hostility by the private sector towards regulatory change. A lack of 
regulation typically allows the private sector to externalize the costs of risks to CI and prevent tort 
liability of compensating losses from disrupted services (Pursiainen, 2018).  Public-private partnerships 
have been proposed to ensure resilience when the government is legally responsible for CI despite the 
reality that CI is primarily owned and operated by the private sector, which was explored within the 
research but with little criticism. As a result of the limited criticism, political agendas will continue to rely 
on partnerships between the public and private sectors without exploring alternative options and assessing 
their efficacy. Other such solutions include establishing clear delineations of roles and responsibilities 
between governments and the private sector and stricter regulation for CI sectors that are privately owned 
and operated in place of self-regulation (Pursiainen, 2018).  
Additionally, the solutions proposed in the literature are almost all intended for use by CI owners 
and operators, which implicitly shifts the responsibility to enhance CI resilience to that particular 
stakeholder. As identified in the literature, three other stakeholders are involved with ensuring resilience 
and the emphasis on technical solutions can exclude the other stakeholders, creating a barrier to 
operationalizing the concept in real-life. As discussed in Chapter 2, the limited perspective on the 
solutions for CI resilience has limited the understanding of the problem and created a significant barrier to 
holistic solutions. Therefore the concept requires a much broader understanding of the solutions outside 
of the purely technical contexts. 
Uncertainty Assessing CI Resilience 
Although many articles in the dataset focus on the development or application of frameworks to 
assess CI resilience, there is still limited consesus as to the best methods for the assessment of resilience 
or real-life application of standardized frameworks. Although much of the research focuses on developing 
a practical methodology for assessing resilience, there is inadequate research to assess current industry 





assessing resilience, what methodology or indicators are used to assess resilience and whether the 
assessment of resilience has mobilized CI organizations or industries to improve resilience. These 
findings indicate a potential lack of communication between the scholars researching CI resilience and the 
owners and operators of CI. Suppose there is no coordination between the academic community and the 
operators of CI sectors, then the research conducted by the academic community is limited without the 
full breadth of knowledge of what is occuring on the ground within CI sectors. Additionally, there will 
also be limited implications of research findings because the two stakeholders are not communicating.  
Furthermore, the significant overlap in the literature surrounding the most appropriate indicator 
for assessing resilience, which appears to be analyzing disruption data (e.g. the number of people who 
experienced service disruption and the duration of service disruption), indicates some degree of consensus 
in the academic community. This finding can mobilize more operationalization of resilience assessment in 
CI industries as well as work as the building block for a standardized CI resilient assessment tool or 
methodology. Future research could analyze how CI sectors assess resilience in practice and utilize 
research findings to apply these indicators in real-life scenarios. Analyzing indicators in practice would 
provide useful insight as to how to accurately assess resilience as it could capture cascading effects not 






Chapter 6: Conclusion and Future Research Directions 
Communities rely on critical infrastructure (CI) to ensure the provision of critical public services, 
economic growth, and social development. Globally, the dominant sectors are energy, water, transport, 
information and communication technology, health, food supply, banking and finance, government 
services, safety and emergency services. Major and minor events can have significant impacts on critical 
infrastructure, which can cause extreme harm to the well-being of society. Since the late 1990s, countries 
have been designing and implementing public policies and strategies to protect CI from various threats 
effectively. Initially, policies were focused on the physical protection of CI to physical threats such as 
terrorism due to events such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States and 2004 Madrid and 2005 
London terrorist attacks but have quickly evolved to reflect the evolving and unpredictable global 
landscape of threats such natural disasters, ageing infrastructure, cyber-attacks and many more. 
Furthermore, globally widespread market liberalization and privatization policies, particularly in 
North American and Europe, have led to the transfer of ownership and operation of CI from the 
government to the private sector. Alongside this transition, there has also been a trend of deregulation of 
several industries and fiscal austerity, leaving many CI systems self-regulated and underfunded (Curt & 
Tacnet, 2018; Murray & Grubesic, 2012; Pursiainen, 2018). Furthermore, globalization has resulted in an 
unprecedented level of interconnectedness between countries CI leaving no country immune to the 
impacts of failure or disruption to their neighbour countries’ infrastructure (OECD, 2019; Pursiainen, 
2018). 
Scholars have noted that the adoption of “critical infrastructure resilience” is necessary to ensure the 
safety and well-being of global communities in light of the evolving landscape of threats, including 
political threats and the intricate interconnectedness of global infrastructure. Furthermore, the 
Organization for Economic, Co-operation and Development (OECD) has established the need for 
governments to adopt resilience-based approaches as part of their national strategies to ensure the service 
continuity of critical infrastructures, but the state of academic knowledge around the concept has not been 
well-established. The concept has emerged in scholarly literature relatively recently. It shows promising 
signs of interest by researchers, but some of the most fundamental questions around the concept are still 
not widely understood, such as: What does critical infrastructure mean? How is it assessed?; How can 
governments, policy leaders, practitioners and CI owners and operators enhance CI resilience?. 





definitions to ensure they relevancy of the concept to address their specific class of problems. The lack of 
development of critical infrastructure resilience has presented limitations in the application and 
operationalization in real-life.  
For these reasons, this research sought to fill the research gap around establishing current knowledge 
of CI resilience among the literature and address several fundamental questions about the concept to 
ensure a consistent understanding of the concept and the literature through systematic review 
methodology. I chose a systematic review as they are regarded as the most effective means to synthesize 
information from multiple research sources. They follow a structured sequence of steps, including 
planning the review, searching for literature, applying inclusion and exclusion criteria to select the final 
list of papers, extracting data and analysis and synthesis. By following a standard methodology, they seek 
to be transparent and reproducible. Furthermore, through their synthesis of many sources of information, 
the results emerging from systematic reviews are capable of informing essential processes of decision-
making, research and policy. This research utilized an adapted version of the PRISMA protocol for 
systematic reviews for a qualitative review.  
For the methods utilized for synthesis and analysis, the researcher reviewed the data and conducted 
both a descriptive and thematic analysis. The descriptive analysis clarified the main characteristics in the 
dataset, in this case, the publication date, study location, research field and journal type, and research 
methodology. The descriptive analysis provided valuable insights as to the trends across CI resilience 
research. In addition, the research employed the six phases of thematic analysis as outlined in Braun & 
Clarke (2006), which includes reading the data, generating codes, searching for themes, defining themes 
and producing the report. This process organizes data for the research to identify patterns and key themes 
across research objectives and findings to report the state of knowledge in the field of study and to inform 
future research agendas.  
There are several weaknesses of systematic reviews, such as the degree of methodological rigour used 
when conducting the study. There are potentially some misleading or biased conclusions. To address this 
limitation, the research closely followed the PRISMA checklist to best reduce bias by clearly defining and 
explaining each step in the methodological process to improve the transparency of the review and 
decrease bias. Another limitation is that systematic reviews for qualitative research with strict guidelines 





limitation, the researcher incorporated information and findings from grey documents, such as policy 
documents, legislation and research reports, to offer additional insights in the research findings and gaps.  
The following research questions were developed to guide the study: 
1. How is CI resilience conceptualized in the scholarly literature? 
2. What is the current state of knowledge and extant research findings of CI resilience? 
3. What are the necessary future research directions to further advance knowledge of CI resilience? 
Several conclusions drawn from the results, to answer the guiding research questions which are described 
in detail below. 
1. How is CI resilience conceptualized in the scholarly literature? 
CI resilience has only been explored and studied in the last decade withinacademic research, but there 
has not been enough interest by academic scholars to thoroughly and robustly conceptualize the concept. 
In addition, the concept has predominately been conceptualized in the context of the Global North, based 
on the journals reviewed, which indicates more narrow perspectives and understandings of the concept 
which potentially limits the application of the concept globally. Furthermore, CI resilience is 
conceptualized predominately in technical fields such as engineering and physics. Still, the research 
results demonstrate some interdisciplinary perspectives of the concept with research conducted in disaster 
management, human geography, political sciences, business and economics. The research results indicate 
that the concept will continue to be studied across various research disciplines providing a more holistic 
understanding of CI resilience.  
2. What is the current state of knowledge and extant research findings of CI resilience? 
The understanding of the term CI resilience continues to be more closely related to its origins in the 
engineering and physics fields. The definitions commonly used among current research emphasize the 
protection and minimization of impacts on the physical structures that do not capture CI's complexity, 
which requires a more robust definition. The definition should more closely reflect the perspectives of 
societal resilience, which would focus on minimizing social and economic impacts and seek to improve 





research is on technical resilience. At the same time, the literature indicates that societal resilience is 
better equipped to reduce societal impacts from the disruption of CI from crises or disasters. 
Furthermore, the literature indicates an over-emphasis on examining physical risks to CI, which has 
left a substantial research gap analyzing the impacts of non-physical hazards (e.g. cyber-attacks and 
political threats, such as deregulation and privatization) on the resilience of CI. The CI resilience research 
focuses primarily on energy, transport and water infrastructure, which has left several vital sectors 
neglected in the research. CI sectors such as food production and distribution, healthcare, emergency 
services and first responders, and manufacturing which play an integral role in the functioning of society, 
have almost entirely been left out of the current CI resilience research. 
 Finally, the CI resilience research primarily focused on enhancing resilience, assessing resilience, 
applying case studies, or developing frameworks for CI resilience. Research results indicated an over-
emphasis on technical solutions to enhance resilience and suggested a limited understanding and analysis 
of how public policy tools can work to enhance CI resilience. Similarly, many frameworks developed in 
the research are primarily quantitative and technical, intended to be used by owners and operators of CI. 
There is limited use of qualitative frameworks for enhancing or assessing resilience that could be used by 
policymakers or government leaders for non-technical solutions. Additionally, much of the research in the 
dataset seeks to understand how to assess CI resilience best. Although there is some indication of a most 
effective method for assessing resilience, in this case, it uses the indicator “service disruption days”, the 
results further indicate a limited usage of consistent indicators in real-life CI sectors.  
3. What are the necessary future research directions to further advance knowledge of CI resilience? 
Based on the research findings provided in this review, the following future research directions are 









Additional Development of CI Resilience in Social Sciences Research Disciplines 
As identified in the research results, the concept of CI resilience remains understudied in fields 
outside of engineering which, as criticized by several scholars has limited the understanding of the 
problems surrounding CI, barriers and challenges and the holistic solutions for effective risk 
management.Without a robust understanding of the concept in socio-political and behavioural science 
contexts, the problems and solutions surrounding CI resilience will remain highly technical and likely 
result in limited operationalization in political agendas, particularly at the local level. For this reason, 
future research surrounding CI resilience in various social sciences research disciplines is highly 
recommended to improve the academic understanding of the concept outside of its technical contexts and 
enable the integration into political agendas and governance tools. Future research could work closely 
with the OECD as they publish regular research reports surrounding the socio-political dimensions of CI 
resilience globally (OECD, 2019). 
More Geographically Diverse CI Research  
The research results indicate a lack of CI resilience research outside of the Global North which 
substantially limits the perspectives and knowledge on the concept. In particular, based on the dataset in 
this research, developing countries were almost entirely excluded which hinders the ability for CI 
resilience to apply in those countries. Investment in the infrastructure of developing countries is an 
important goal of many international agreements, including the Paris Agreement, which seeks to mitigate 
global climate change and adapt to its adverse impacts (OECD, 2021). If there is to be accelerated 
investment, development and retrofitting of infrastructure in these countries it is vital to have the 
knowledge for how exactly the infrastructure needs to be developed to ensure effective resilience to a 
wide range of risks in those countries. For this reason, future research surrounding CI resilience should be 
more geographically diverse and perhaps focus more specifically on developing countries as they appear 
to be almost entirely neglected from the data.  
Increased Focus on Societal Resilience 
The literature indicates that societal resilience is needed to respond during CI disruptions and 
disasters. This is, however, a limited focus on societal resilience in CI resilience research. Researchers in 





cohesion in understanding how well a community recovers following a disaster. For example, researchers 
observed a more efficient recovery in low-income communities following severe flooding due to 
Hurricane Katrina compared to the richer neighbourhoods in New Orleans, which were less damaged and 
did not recover as efficiently. The factor impacting recovery was determined to be the high social capital 
(Aldrich & Meyer, 2015). Therefore, future CI resilience research should focus more on assessing and 
enhancing societal resilience to understand how social capital and networks can reduce the social and 
economic losses and impacts from disruptions to CI. 
Climate Change, Natural Hazards and Flooding 
Finally, as climate change continues to pose a severe and significant threat to many societies and 
their critical infrastructure, there is a need for future research to focus on the intersection between climate 
change, natural hazards, floods and critical infrastructure resilience. Future research should seek to 
understand the degree to which critical infrastructure is at risk due to climate change, in the form of 
extreme weather, natural hazards and flooding, and what measures, tools and technologies must be put 
into place to ensure the resilience of CI. The OECD has identified climate change and the associated risks 
such as flooding and sea-level rise as significant current and future risks to critical infrastructure systems 
globally (OECD, 2019). Climate change poses a unique threat as it causes increasingly frequent and 
intense disaster events that cannot be predicted by historical data. Therefore, climate change requires 
designing, adapting and retrofitting infrastructure which is capable of withstanding unprecedented events. 
Research in this area is needed to provide insights and guidance to inform effective and efficient 
investment to enable resilient critical infrastructure.  
Additional Research Analyzing Non-physical Hazards 
Non-physical hazards such as cyber-attacks and political threats pose a significant threat to CI 
resilience. The results indicate limited research analyzing the risk that non-physical hazards pose to CI, 
which are significant shock events that can disrupt CI's functioning and result in large social or economic 
impacts. In particular, the OECD identifies digital threats, like cyber-attacks, as significant threats to CI 
resilience as sophisticated technology can allow for digital terrorism to impact transportation 
infrastructure, chemical and nuclear plants and even waste systems. The findings from the OECD indicate 
necessary future research needs to analyze the threat of non-physical hazards to CI resilience (OECD, 





understanding of the various risks by exploring the efficacy of an all-hazards approach to improving 
resilience to capture the wide portfolio of risks threatening CI effectively.  
Diversifying CI Industry Research 
Several CI industries are severely understudied and require further study in the future. The 
limited understanding of the degree to which sectors are resilient and how they can improve resilience 
compromises broader resilience of CI industries such as food production and distribution, healthcare, 
emergency services and essential manufacturing should focus on future CI research to understand their 
current degree of resilience in various regions and communities globally. This research is required to 
inform policies and practices to improve overall resilience. For example, the most recent global pandemic 
has brought to light the need for global health systems to assess their resilience when impacted by a 
highly contagious virus as many hospitals reported overcrowding, understaffing and an undersupply of 
personal protective equipment (Deloitte, 2020). 
Examining Empirical Public Policy Tools 
Future research surrounding the topics of CI resilience should conduct an in-depth analysis of the 
practical public policy tools currently in place aimed at enhancing CI resilience. The objective is to 
understand what public policy tools are in place, their efficacy, and which public policy tools are required 
to improve overall CI resilience better. The OECD indicates that stringent regulations such as inspections, 
performance assessments, mandatory business continuity plans and fines, or other penalties, for non-
compliance with resilience requirements are underutilized in many OECD countries. An academic 
analysis of the various regulatory and policy tools for CI resilience and their effectiveness can permeate 
the public sector to pave the way for the adoption of more stringent measures to enhance CI resilience.  
Critical Infrastructure Resilience and Systematic Reviews 
Finally, CI resilience is a concept which still requires substantial academic development to 
establish a fundamental understanding. Although this review provided some answers to fundamental 
questions, there are still several questions left which require an answer. For example, which public policy 
tools are discussed across literature and grey documents to address CI resilience? Furthermore, there are 
several limitations to this review, including potential bias and some limitations to the data included in the 





follow rigorous guidelines for its methodology, and can be easily compared and contrasted for that 
reason. Since CI resilience has only emerged in the academic literature in the last decade or so, there is a 
benefit to incorporating grey literature into the systematic reviews to provide a robust understanding of 
the topic which could address the second limitation. In addition, future systematic reviews could focus 
more specifically on just one question for the review (e.g. what are the risks to CI as discussed in the 
literature?), as opposed to the broader questions posed in this review which could provide an in-depth 
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